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Chapter 1—Introduction
Visual Culture and Terrorism: A Literature Review

A new age of visual culture has proceeded to affect the world we live in and
has simultaneously made us both active participants and spectators within society.
This new age is characterized by more sophisticated forms of communication
technologies that have emerged from the Twentieth Century and have influenced
the way we interact with images. More specifically, this period “can be seen as an
acceleration of a longer history involving photography, film, television and video”
that would incline those within visual culture studies to “suggest that everyday life
has become ‘visual culture.”1 These sophisticated technologies include digitization,
satellite imaging, new forms of medical imaging and virtual reality, ibid. Particularly
relevant to the study of visual culture is “tak[ing] account of the centrality of vision
in everyday experience and the production of meaning [because]…the scrap of an
image connects with a sequence…to produce a new narrative formed out of both our
experienced journey and our unconscious” ibid., 63. That is to say that the personal
viewing experience of images met with the narratives produced within a societal
construct, also known as the daily life experiences within the lived society, shape the
reality of an individual, thus creating a personal narrative.
Digital technologies have impacted visual culture mainly through its scope,
outreach and accessibility, and through this impact the visual component has
become a form of power within the society, a power that affects both the audience
Theo Van Leeuwen and Carey Jewitt. Handbook of Visual Analysis. (California: Sage
Publishing, 2001): 62.
1
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and the producer of the image. As such, it becomes vital not only to understand this
power, but to also understand who holds this power within the visual component,
especially when relating it to the violent component; also known as visual violence.
As suggested by Friis“…[I]n the era of new media technologies and increased visual
interconnectivity across borders, the communication of the horrors of war through
visual imagery has been transformed and accelerated,”2 thereby transforming visual
violence into a tool that tries to establish visual power that can play into the hands
of all parties involved. The visual power is characterized by its psychological impact
it holds from the audience who views the visual violence. Additionally, the more
inhumane the visual violence is perceived in a performance, the more the viewer
will respond and potentially act.
The production of meaning within visual culture studies has provided a good
backdrop of which to evaluate visual violence and understand the power that it
possesses. Moreover, the centrality of vision has also become useful for those who
study visual culture, saying that it “can not be confined to the study of images
[alone].”3 Solely relying on images to understand their impact on society is limiting,
especially when attempting to understand visual violence as a strategic tool. When
used as a strategic tool, there is a societal meaning associated with the image that is
produced as a form of narration. Hence, both the production of meaning and the
centrality of vision are at the forefront when discussing cases of individuals,
Simone Molin Friis, “‘Beyond anything we have ever seen’: Beheading videos and
the visibility of violence in the war against ISIS,” International Affairs 91, no. 4
(2015): 728.
3 Theo Van Leeuwen and Carey Jewitt. Handbook of Visual Analysis. (California: Sage
Publishing, 2001): 63.
2
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organizations, and groups who resort to utilizing visual violence as a strategy. This
is because the visual component affects the way meaning is produced through
violent images when they are narrated against the backdrop of society. In order to
understand what this means for the power of visual violence within a strategy, it is
essential to understand how the visual component interacts with the violent
component.

Performance Violence and the Spectacle
Violence, whose meaning is commonly seen as physical force intended to
hurt or harm an individual, is an act whose effect and impact would seemingly be on
the individual who incurs the act and the person who perpetrates the act. However
there is another impact on the person viewing the violence, whether it is seen in real
life events or through a screen (often times narrative forms of entertainment). This
particular impact on the viewer is emotional abuse and its effect is psychological in
nature, that within this visual culture holds a different, perhaps more substantial
kind of weight than physical force. When discussing violence within the context of
emotional abuse, both the real life viewership and the narrative that is produced
within the individual psyche when viewing through forms of entertainment will,
thus, have a relatively higher emotional impact on the spectator. Understandably,
there is variance within the degree to which real life spectatorship compares to
narrative forms of entertainment on the psychological impact incurred by the visual
component. Though the concept of visual violence can encompass many scenarios,
the focus here is on visual violence within terrorist acts, which when their images
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and constructed narrations are analyzed, appear to be within the spectrum of
entertainment and real life events that are placed within the dimensions of the
spectacle and theatre.
Nacos discusses the impact of the 9/11 attacks as a movie spectacle where
“they outperformed Hollywood…[with] the horror of the quadruple hijack coup and
the deliberate flights into the World Trade Center and Pentagon.”4 It was a form of
terrorism that produced “a global television spectacular, as breaking news that
[was] watched by international audiences and transcend[ed] by far the boundaries
of theatrical events, ibid.” Their target choice and timing, having been performed in
the “bright daylight, guaranteed the most “spectacular” visuals and the loss of life
for which they undoubtedly aimed, ibid.” This spectacular form of entertainment
performed as a terrorist act, was so dramatic with its Hollywood inspired climatic
plot, that the emotional impact was felt worldwide with various responses. This
“perfectly orchestrated production ibid” was performed as a spectacle.
Guy Debord, adopting a Marxist approach, defines the spectacle in terms of
specialization of power that represents a hierarchical society, as “the existing
order’s uninterrupted discourse about itself…is the self portrait of power in the
epoch of its totalitarian management of the of existence…separation is the alpha and
omega of the spectacle…the mythical order with which every power shrouds itself
from the beginning.”5 The spectacle is a “pseudo-sacred entity” that is a “separate
power developing in itself, in the growth of productivity by means of incessant
Brigette L. Nacos, “The Terrorist Calculus Behind 9-11: A Model for Future
Terrorism?” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 26, no. 1 (2003): 3.
5 Guy Debord, Society of the spectacle. (Detroit: Black & Red, 1983): 23-25.
4
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refinement of the division of labor,” ibid., 25. Moreover, “the spectacle originates in
the loss of unity of the world” ibid., 29. Hence, based on Debord’s description of
separate power being that of the alpha and the omega of the spectacle means those
who separate the images in a sequence that is not based on reality have the power
to produce the meaning of which the viewers will react. Because the totalitarian
power has control of the production of meaning within the visual component, they
are capable of influencing the audience without it knowing what is happening. The
spectacle, an unreal scene, influences the viewer’s perceptions in a way that they
lose the purpose of viewing.
The purpose of viewing is explained within the context of Jacques Ranciè re’s
description of theatre clarifying it in terms of community action and active
participation. For him the concept of viewing is a “means to take pleasure in images
and the reality outside the theatre.”6 The spectacle, defined against Debord’s
description of separation, is seen as an “autonomous thing, between the idea of the
artist and the sensation or comprehension of the spectator,” ibid., 14. Here, the
spectacle can be defined as the “[confusion] of two different distances [such as]…the
distance between artist and spectator…[that is]…“inherent in the performance
itself,” ibid.
Ranciè re, in his description of spectacle, provides useful concepts to analyze
the visual impact of violence or rather the visual power within violence with his use
of the “autonomous thing.” The “autonomous thing” is that which we cannot
comprehend when watching the visual violence on screen. It is the distance between
6

Jacques Ranciè re, The Emancipated Spectator, (London: Verso, 2009): 12.
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the producer and the spectator, which we associate as a spectacle. Hence the
“autonomous thing” creates confusion because it is something that is
incomprehensive in the performance itself. This idea of the spectacle is in contrast
to the form of theatre in which the distance from the spectator and the artist is
ideally non-existent, and by Ranciè re’s definition is attributed to community action.
Performance violence is best described as a form of theater used for dramatic
effect where the scene itself, capturing an inhumane death, physical force, or
authoritarian power, is both a spectacle and staged theatrics. Inhumane refers to
“acts of deliberately exaggerated violence”7 whose “gruesome sight” is ”vivid and
horrifying” that ”by their demonstrative nature…elicit feelings of revulsion and
anger in those who witness them,” ibid., 122-126. “Performance violence…are
dramas designed to have an impact on several audiences that they affect [and] those
who witness the violence—even at a distance, via the news media—are…apart of
what occurs,” ibid., 126. The psychological effect in performance violence is the
response from the viewer whose personal narrative, a combination of daily life and
visual images produced from the performance continues to shape how he will
interact within the society he/she lives. In this way “in practice, it is seldom, if ever,
possible to separate the cultures of everyday life from practices of representation,
visual or otherwise,”8 meaning that the personal narrative produced from the
performance (a practice of representation) is a reflection of everyday life.

Mark Juergensmeyer, “Theater of Terror,” in Terror in the Mind of God: The Global
Rise of Religious Violence. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003): 122.
8 Theo Van Leeuwen and Carey Jewitt. Handbook of Visual Analysis. (California: Sage
Publishing, 2001): 61.
7
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Visual Violence and War
While it is the theatre spectacular that plays an important role in the
literature to provoke a response from the opponent, it is clear that the literature on
terrorism lacks an understanding of the impact of visual violence on the politics of
war. Friis, in particular, notes a lack of focus on the actual analysis of the act of
watching beheading videos and its connection to the politics of war or what he
expresses as “the significance of visual imagery for international conflict and
security,” adding that “the way in which the visibility of the beheadings shapes the
politics of war in the states ‘watching’ the videos has been largely neglected as an
object of study.”9 Friis focuses on the ISIS videos’ impact on the politics of war in the
victims’ home states and provides evidence that the “ISIS beheadings have
functioned as ‘visual facts’ within a political discourse promoting military action
against ISIS,” ibid. His calls for more attention to be paid to the “boundaries between
which acts of violence are rendered visible and which are not” ibid., 728.
The choice of the producer of the violent images to show to the wider
audience in this day and age affects the politics of war because it holds a certain
strategic advantage toward the party who chooses the image. This choice from the
producer to choose the visual violent images becomes important for its
psychological impact on the adversary. Those who use visual violence on a strategic
level need to elicit a strong response from the adversary in order for it function as a
tool within warfare.
Simone Molin Friis, “‘Beyond anything we have ever seen’: Beheading videos and
the visibility of violence in the war against ISIS,” International Affairs 91, no. 4
(2015): 726-727.
9
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However, from a broader perspective visual communication holds its own
power, whether the image is produced intentionally or not. This power is not in the
control of the producer, but rather from those who interpret the images for their
own political agenda. In this case, the power resides with those who can control the
interpretation and the message of the image.

Terrorism—A Dispute of Definitions is all Rhetorically Justified
The debates that surround terrorism, and more specifically its definition, are
made controversial based on a rhetorical approach that tends to dwell around the
moral and political dimensions as oppose to creating a useful political science
theory that objectively explains the phenomenon.
Finlay describes three “rhetorical possibilities” typically used as “definitional
criteria” that include: 1) “basic moral or political values,” 2) “descriptive
criteria…derived…from…basic norms” and 3) conventional descriptive criteria.10 He
goes on to say that speakers who “do things with the word ‘terrorist’…typically
involve ‘redescription’…a mainstay of ordinary moral language as well as forensic
oratory” ibid. Given the convoluted nature of defining terrorism, Finlay discusses
the controversy in terms of rhetoric saying that it is “of ordinary ‘redescription’”
ibid., 756. Whether it is revisionary descriptions tending toward a more persuasive
definition where “speakers try to alter public attitudes and achieve wider
ideological change,” (ibid) or emphatic descriptions “where speakers seek to

Christopher Finlay, “How to do things with the Word ‘Terrorist,’” Review of
International Studies 35 no. 4 (2009): 754.
10
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emphasize its moral affinity with terrorism,” (ibid) Finlay argues that, “there will
always be disagreement about the right criteria,” ibid., 759.
He convincingly places a revisionary descriptive label on all the work of
scholars in terrorism. However, he places this debate on basic criterion being that of
“the use of civilian, ‘innocent,’ or non-combatant targeting” which he refers to as
“the ‘orthodox’ approach to definition,” ibid., 760-764. His critique on the scholars is
only useful within an ethical approach to terrorism, or rather in the debates based
on morality, and in this way perhaps there is no sense in defining terrorism. But
perhaps, there is a better way to approach terrorism as a method within warfare
that is separate from any war justification.
Among the debate of defining terrorism are also its legal dimensions, which
arguably fall under Finlay’s revisionary redescription to which many other scholars
have argued its results to be fruitless and unnecessary. Levitt so eloquently explains
the attempts at legal definitions akin to “the quest for the Holy Grail [where]…others
before have tried and failed…[and] some daunted by the difficulties and dangers
along the way, give up, often declaring the quest meaningless. Others return
claiming victory, proudly bearing an object they insist is the real thing but which to
everyone else looks more like the same old used cup, perhaps re-decorated in a
slightly original way.”11 He concludes that not only would a legal definition of
terrorism not be beneficial, but due to the international context, with “the
intractable conceptual and political differences among states on the issue, it would
be at best a watered-down, papered-over, exception-ridden orphan whose main
Geoffrey Levitt, “Is ‘Terrorism’ Worth Defining?” Ohio Northern University Law
Review 13 (1986): 97.
11
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practical result would provide a further basis for dispute…at the United Nations”
ibid., 115.
Nathanson acknowledges this definitional challenge within his moral
dimension of explaining terrorism saying that the difficulty resides in the fact that
many approach it in a political as opposed to a theoretical way12 and “the debate
about defining terrorism becomes impossible to resolve because it mirrors
disagreements about contentious moral and political issues” ibid., 15. Therefore,
practicing politicians, journalists, and even scholars use this moral and political
context that plays into the agenda of labeling the terrorist as wrong against that
which is right. He suggests the best way to define terrorism is by “focusing on
terrorist acts rather than terrorist groups” because the latter is, frankly, confusing,
ibid., 14. He notes that “we need to focus on the idea of a terrorist act, directing our
attention to what is done, not who does it” because “what makes them terrorists is
the nature of the acts themselves, not the group that carried them out” ibid. He
further outlays that a definition “that is morally and politically neutral [would]
enable us to label acts as terrorist or not independently of our views on whether
they are morally justifiable or not” ibid., 15.
Herschinger approaches defining international terrorism through a
discursive perspective and explains the phenomenon in terms of collective identitybuilding process where the identity of ‘self’ is defined against the ‘other’.13 “An
Stephen Nathanson, Terrorism and the Ethics of War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 13.
13 Eva Herschinger, “A Battlefield of Meanings: The Struggle for Identity in the UN
Debates on a Definition of International Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence
25 no. 2 (2013): 186.
12
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absolute enemy is clearly present in the UN debates on terrorism…[to which]
terrorism symbolizes the absolute threat to humanity,” ibid., 191.
With all this said however, the only benefit from this discursive and
rhetorical definitional approach is for counterterrorism measures, which tend to be
better for practice rather than explaining the phenomenon objectively. As many
scholars would suggest, use of the word terrorist tends to have a moral and political
agenda attached to the endeavor. As such if terrorism studies intends to understand
the phenomenon, there should be detachment of negative connotations of the term
that would imply a moral or political categorization.
Whether terrorism is wrong is not relevant as it is akin to associating it with
the justifications within war. This is to say that if war can be justified as right, then
so can terrorism. McPherson says “much of this language is not helpful in morally
distinguishing terrorism, since conventional war tends to be at least as ‘ruthlessly
destructive,’ ‘unpredictable,’ and ‘horrific’ for noncombatants and combatants.”14
Though his definition includes “the deliberate use of force against ordinary
noncombatants,” the fact that war is as horrific for noncombatants as it is for
combatants creates a lot of confusion on the moral front of both war and terrorism.
Steinhoff further discredits the ethics of terrorism when he says that “even if the
United States were to succeed in its ‘war against terrorism’…there would be only a
little less violence in the world. There would certainly not be more justice.”15 Even
Scheffler assumes that “terrorism may sometimes be a response to great wrongs,
Lionel K. McPherson, “Is Terrorism Distinctively Wrong?” Ethics 117, no. 3 (2007):
525.
15 Uwe Steinhoff, On the Ethics of War and Terrorism (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2007): 134.
14
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and great wrongs may be committed in opposing it.”16 And in her discussion of
terrorism and war, Held associates terrorism to small war and goes as far to say
“…the violence used to suppress terrorism is the price paid to maintain the status
quo, as the violence used by the dissatisfied group is the price paid to pursue its
goal, [and] from a moral point of view, it is entirely appropriate to compare these
levels of violence.”17
As the literature suggests, the justifications associated for going to war can
be made the same for justifying terrorism, to which the act of justifying becomes
nothing more than a blaming mechanism that enforces the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ or the
‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy. In this sense the justifications become another form of
discursive and legal approaches that have also proven to be meaningless within the
literature. Retired General Michael Hayden makes claim to this rhetorical device
discussing the moral dilemmas. He justifies attacking the enemy and pointedly says
it involves tough decisions because it is reality we live in.18 The real world offers
those who practice making decisions the moral clarity to do what they do, that by
labeling the enemy as a terrorist becomes a tactful device when justifying war.

Terrorism as a Means is More Than What it Seems
Though a discursive approach forebodes uncertainty within the term,
perhaps a different method from a historical perspective would fulfill a better
Samuel Scheffler, “Is Terrorism Morally Distinctive?” The Journal of Political
Philosophy 14 no. 1 (2006): 2.
17 Virginia Held, “Terrorism and War,” The Journal of Ethics 8 no. 1 (2004): 68.
18 Michael Hayden, Playing to the Edge: American Intelligence in the Age of Terror
(New York: Penguin, 2016).
16
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definition to explain terrorism as a phenomenon. Though Hoffman lays out the
changing meaning of terrorism throughout its history from the French Revolutions
regime de la terreur to Carlo Pisacane’s theory of “propaganda of the deed” circa
1857 and the use of this concept by terrorist groups in nineteenth-century Russia to
1930’s Italy, Germany and Russia to the Second World War and the September 11
attacks in New York City and Washington D.C.,19 these accounts offer precedents of
the rhetorical dimension of the word which has proven to have little value in
explaining the phenomenon. Instead of looking at historical representations of
terrorism on a rhetorical basis, it would be of more help to look at history from the
accounts taken by the terrorist.
Garrison has resulted to approach terrorism by looking at the records that
terrorists themselves have offered. He attempts to establish a “continuity of
thought” by reviewing the writings of terrorists’ agendas dating back to the 18th
century with the famed French Revolutionary Robespierre and his arguments of
virtue and terror to the more recent Osama bin Laden.20 He concludes that the
“examination of their writings reveals that terrorists share a common
understanding of the utility of terror [that by] their adoption of terror as a tool to
achieve their respective goals and their view on the utility and necessity of violence
to achieve those goals are not dissimilar” ibid., 260.

Bruce Hoffman, “Defining Terrorism,” in Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2006), 3-19.
20 Arthur Garrison, “Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by
Deed and Change through Fear and Violence,” Criminal Justice Studies 17 no. 3
(2004): 260-262.
19
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The most compelling argument derived from these historical writings is the
proof “that terrorism is not explained by the cause, because causes change.
Terrorism is [rather] defined by the rationalization, logic and perception of how to
effect change” ibid., 263. Those figures namely Robespierre, Hitler, Lenin, Stalin,
Mao, Nechaev, Bakunin and Osama bin Laden, all used “terror to instill fear” within
their target whether that be countrymen or a government, ibid. Hence, to define
terrorism based on a rational approach, where the means justify the ends, is the
most beneficial and useful to explain the phenomenon of terrorism. As Garrison
points out, “terrorists are different when viewed from the social context of time, the
target selection of the terror, the reason for the use of terror, the justification of the
use of terror, the evil that terrorists seek to address, and the goals they have…but
the use of terror as a tool to achieve desired goals has not changed” ibid.
Nathanson argues “that we should define terrorism in terms of means rather
than ends,”21 and Garrison found a pattern within terrorist writings that supports
Nathanson’s argument that “terrorism is best understood as a tactic, a means of
fighting,” (ibid.) when he discusses the “utility of terror”22 as a tool. He says, “It is
this uniformity in the use of terrorism as a tool to achieve a desired political, social
and/or religious goal that allows for a neutral and systemic definition of terrorism,”
ibid. This idea stems from focusing on the nature of terrorist acts in which “the act
of using terror defines the terrorist,” ibid., 272.
Stephen Nathanson, Terrorism and the Ethics of War (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 19.
22 Arthur Garrison, “Defining Terrorism: Philosophy of the Bomb, Propaganda by
Deed and Change through Fear and Violence,” Criminal Justice Studies 17 no. 3
(2004): 260.
21
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The argument that terrorism is a means is furthered by Dexter’s discussion of
terrorism and violence. In his attempt to make sense of terrorism, he discusses it in
terms of a violent communication tool. He refers to terrorism as a category of
violence to which “violence is targeted against civilians…[and] intentionally targets
civilians or intentionally terrorizes; that terrorism is a communicative form of
violence; and finally that terrorism is an exceptional form of violence.”23 Hence,
“terrorism as a category of violence can only be understood in relation to warfare,”
ibid., 125. In the end, in Dexter’s discussion he argues that terrorism is a means, a
form of violence that communicates. As such, the logic behind studying the power of
visual violence as a tool becomes necessary within today’s political environment
because many terrorists’ acts are being carried out through the utility of visual
terror.

Research Framework, Methodology, and Case studies
In his opening, in the classic work Arms and Influence, Thomas Schelling says,
“the usual distinction between diplomacy and force is not merely in the instruments,
words or bullets, but in the relation between adversaries—in the interplay of
motives and the role of communication, understanding, compromise and restraint,”
(Schelling, 1). The key word here is interplay. The interplay between non-state actor
and state actor within asymmetric warfare, one where the weaker entity goes up
against the stronger entity, is a vital distinction that defines the relationship
between the two adversaries and the way they interact. This relationship is defined
Helen Dexter, “Terrorism and Violence: Another Violence is Possible?” Critical
Studies on Terrorism 5, no. 1 (2012): 122.
23
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by the use of visual communication because it acts as a form of power for the nonstate actor against its stronger adversary. It enforces the inherent threat of violence
that comes from the inhumane images themselves.
Visual communication is valuable to the non-state actor because of its
indirect coercive nature. As Schelling say, “the hurting does no good directly; it can
work only indirectly [to which] coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet
to come than on the damage already done” ibid., 172. This indirect coercion with
which Schelling discusses is the leading framework to explain the assumption that
the non-state actors are acting rationally. Through the communication of their
visually violent and inhumane images, non-state actors are portraying themselves
with the perception of irrational behavior within the act itself. Visual violence, thus,
acts as an extension of extreme communication.
The visually violent images are used as a psychological weapon because it is
one of the few weapons that non-state actors have at their disposal. Two cases of
non-state actors, the Red Brigades and ISIS, will be compared in order to understand
the strategic advantages of visual violence, the underlying argument being that
visual violence is used as a mechanism that enables the perception of irrationality.
Both of these cases have produced their own forms of images that have impacted
their subsequent audiences, and it is this impact to which this research focuses.
Since it is the psychological level that these images resonate with their audiences, it
is imperative to understand how exactly visual violence functions as a tool within
warfare. Moreover, both the Red Brigades and ISIS utilize images that reinforce this
power dynamic making their organization appear more credible than they might
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otherwise appear in reality, as they attempt to act as a representative state through
the function of their images.
The Red Brigades were chosen based on their utilization of images used to
send a message to their associated audience. The production of the three images
they choreographed and publicized is comparable to the dramatically staged
cinematography from the infamous Jordanian pilot video distributed February 8,
2015. Both the Red Brigades and ISIS have produced images that illustrate a visual
narration within the frames. On the one hand the Red Brigades stage their images in
a manner that suits their political agenda with varying levels of violence and
inhumanity illustrated within the frame. Secondly, ISIS visually narrates an
inhumane death whose impact is on those who view the dramatic effect.
While the images themselves are important in terms of visual appeal toward
the audience, what holds the most value in terms of comparing the Red Brigades
against ISIS is the intended fear and publicity. Both the Red Brigades and ISIS,
working within the context of asymmetric warfare, work within their means to
gather the best ends with the tools they have at their disposal. The terror tactic
becomes the visual violence framed within the image whereby the intention from
both non-state actors is to cause a high level of fear. Likewise, both actors work
within their means to obtain the highest level of publicity within their audience.
Because fear is an essential emotive quality that is instigated within the
frame, the central method is a visual analysis that is used in order to conceptualize
the performance itself. The concepts of spectacle and theater are important to the
understanding of performance violence that both the Red Brigades and ISIS have

20
chosen within their terrorist acts. The visual analysis is useful when explaining how
the visual component interacts with the violent component within visual violence,
and will highlight where the threat of visual violence serves the non-state actor and
where it hinders their pursuits.

21
Chapter 2
Irrationality versus Rationality

The perception of irrationality associated with visual violence is a constant
outcome because it is likely that visual violence is a mechanism that enables this
perception. Those who argue that terrorists are irrational are limiting their
discussion to the framework that frames the enemy as irrational because to frame
the enemy as a terrorist is one of the main objectives in coercive diplomacy. The
literature that discusses terrorists as irrational actors falls under the category of
‘framing the enemy’ because they are either refuting or agreeing with terrorists as
irrational actors in warfare. Many scholars who refute the idea that terrorism is
irrational illustrate why it is problematic, and the underlying problem throughout
remains that irrationality is based in framing the enemy as a terrorist when terrorist
acts have been committed. Furthermore, when the rhetorical use of terrorism
becomes normal within the lexicon of the global community, it is easier to label the
enemy as irrational.

Terrorism as Irrational
Undoubtedly, the frequency with which the rhetorical use of terrorism has
presented itself in today’s global political environment from both a media and
scholarly level has impacted the discussion and focus of the research. In fact many
who attempt to explain and understand terrorism as a phenomenon have to refute
the idea that terrorists are irrational when explained from a psychological approach.
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They have to argue against those who would label terrorists as irrational and have
done so successfully. Frankly, such an approach has not garnered enough traction
to substantiate any distinction from a terrorist to a non-terrorist.24 As Clark
McCauley says, “…we have to face the fact that normal people can be terrorists, that
we are ourselves capable of terrorist acts under some circumstances,” ibid. Faced
with this disconcerted and outspoken notion, each individual must ask themselves
‘what would I do if circumstances arose that prompted an act of terrorism?’
An individual person does irrational acts, but that does not necessarily mean
a terrorist is irrational when resorting to terrorist acts. Certainly, the act of
purposely-killing innocent civilians and prisoners seems irrational. And when a
labeled terrorist organization conducts a raid on a prison, then leads a mass
execution of a specific and careful selection of 1000 of those prisoners, or when an
organization fighter posts photos on Twitter “of himself holding a severed head in
one hand with the caption, “’Chillin’ with my homie, or what’s left of him,”25 the
typical response is to label these people as mentally unstable, insane and irrational.
Their actions are so brutal, outrageous and attention grabbing that leads the
audience to believe these people have a mental disorder because to publicize not
only the killings of innocent people, but also the enjoyment of doing so seems like an
act of insanity that could only be explained through a mental illness.

Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome”
Versus “Tool” Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 195.
25 Benjamin Hall, Inside ISIS: The Brutal Rise of a Terrorist Army (New York: Center
Street Hachette Book Group, 2015): 58-60.
24
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The literature discussing mental illnesses and terrorism have found no causal
relationship between the two. David Weatherston and Jonathan Moran have argued
such a case and claim that “the process of going underground and engaging in
violent clandestine activities is, by its very nature, hazardous and stressful [in
which] symptoms of pathology may be a natural reaction within the circumstances
and not indicative of a disorder.”26 Their discussion of Post-traumatic stress
disorder (PTSD), often experienced by war veterans, further shows that “the
condition is a natural psychological reaction to an extreme situation and is
experienced not only by combatants but is also manifested by those involved in
extraordinary threatening situations,” ibid., 702-703. This means that an entire
society can experience PTSD if exposed to “long-term exposure to the threat of
physical harm in uncertain circumstances,” ibid., 704. As such, an exposure to war
zones, being an example of a circumstance, the environment to which soldiers,
police, and terrorists can develop mental health problems are natural reactions that
does not necessarily deem one mentally disabled, ibid.
Arie Kruglanski and Shira Fishman have summarized mental traits in what
they term a “syndrome” perspective on terrorism as “contributing factors.”27 They
disqualify the “root causes” of terrorism being traced to one particular personality
variable or situational conditions, but they do not disqualify that the “wide variety of
personality traits…and situational conditions…may well qualify as contributing
David Weatherston and Jonathan Moran. “Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is There a
Relationship?” International Journal of Offender Therapy and Comparative
Criminology 47 no. 6 (2003): 702.
27 Arie W. Kruglanski and Shira Fishman, “The Psychology of Terrorism: “Syndrome”
Versus “Tool” Perspectives,” Terrorism and Political Violence 18, no. 2 (2006): 199.
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factors to terrorism” ibid. Charles Ruby in his quest to argue that “terrorism is
another form of military action,”28 discusses the debate “on whether or not
terrorism is just a sign of psychopathology” (ibid., 21) by referring to the Fourth
edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders to which he
concludes with a definition that “one must also then include as pathology such
diverse activities as law enforcement work, organized crime, professional football
and wartime military activities” ibid. He argues, that “terrorists are not unique in
their susceptibility to these kinds of psychological consequences” and that this can
be seen within the military, ibid., 23.

The effects of 9/11—Government and News Media Response to the Terrorist Threat

The events of 9/11 are well known for giving international recognition to
terrorism, to which has also been associated to Islamic Jihad given the link to al
Qaeda. Therefore, in today’s environment, a group associating itself with Islam is
more easily framed under the terrorist label than any other religion due to the
repercussions of 9/11. This, as a result, has offered governments the means to
legitimize their counterterrorism measures against the targeted enemy to which
they profile as terrorists. As long as they have international support, governments
tend to legitimize their use of military and counterterrorism measures against the
common enemy of terrorism. And if journalists, governments and organizations can
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find a connection to such entities as the Muslim Brotherhood or Al Qaeda, it is easier
to obtain support from such international actors as the United States and Europe.
When faced with terrorist acts, governments typically respond by profiling
the perpetrators as a means to define the enemy. It is a counter terrorism measure
that serves the government and is counter productive to understanding the
phenomenon of terrorism. For instance in her discussion of separatist terrorism
Pokalova says “in today’s world where terrorism is considered a grave international
threat, states have an opportunity to frame their ethno-nationalist conflicts as a
threat of terrorism.”29 Though her analysis is centered around ethnic groups within
a state structure, the framing effect she references is relevant to the current security
apparatus that responses from the coalition of governments is based a group is
labeled as a terrorist.
The framing effect, says Pokalova, is the shaping of “individual opinions
[that] can be shaped through certain emphases on issues of potential resonance
[and as a result], these changes in the presentation of an issue…affect our opinions
about them,” ibid. Furthermore, these issues have a wide range of interpretations
and value systems that play toward the “societal values in order to generate a
desired level of policy support” (ibid) needed by the government. Therefore, since
terrorism holds a definitional ambiguity, policy and decision makers are able to
generate support from the rhetorical use of the concept of terrorism.
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The United States response to terrorism and the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security is an example of when a government securitizes the issue of
terrorism by profiling terrorists. In this way, al Qaeda was given high priority after
the bombings of the Twin Towers in New York. Bryan Mabee describes the creation
of the DHS as “a monumental act of restructuring of the architecture of the US
government”30 that as the United States is a major security actor with the power to
respond to threats, was able to institutionalize a new way to frame security. As such
the United States was able to “[re-think]… the role of borders within US security
policy,” ibid. They institutionalized a response to the threat of terrorism with the
‘War on Terrorism.’
As Judith Miller recounts the events, the reporting, and the responses from
the US government following the 9/11 attacks, she describes then President George
Bush’s national security team’s failure “to give al Qaeda sufficient priority in the first
eight months in office,” and “was determined to compensate by embracing a fierce
“war” on terror.”31 She recalls key decision makers such as then “National Security
Adviser Condoleezza Rice and other senior officials…arguing that the
counterterrorism campaign had to be waged against both the tactic to delegitimize
its use and the people who practiced it,” ibid. Furthermore, their response and the
fact that they “defin[ed] the enemy broadly empowered Washington to forge
alliances against anti-Western Islamist groups that were only loosely linked to alBryan Mabee, “Re-imagining the Borders of US Security after 9/11: Securitisation,
Risk, and the Creation of the Department of Homeland Security,” Globalizations 4,
no. 3 (2007): 386.
31 Judith Miller, The Story: A Reporter’s Journey (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2015): 148-149.
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Qaeda: Hamas in Gaza; Hezbollah, Iran’s proxy in Lebanon; the Islamic Group and
Islamic Jihad in Egypt; Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines; and Jemaah Islamiyah in
Indonesia, ibid. Undoubtedly, the counter terrorism approach that the Bush
Administration enacted was based on the profiling techniques used to create an
enemy through framing them as a terrorist in order to respond to a threat they
neglected to foresee and thereby prevent in the past.
In the last 10 years, Heads of States have been using profiling techniques to
isolate Muslims as the enemy. Recent examples of the rhetorical use of terrorism are
seen in the statements made by Secretary of State John Kerry, Prime Minister David
Cameron, and President Francois Hollande among others, their statements largely
label the perpetrators as irrational. After three Israeli teenagers were kidnapped, a
press statement from John Kerry refers to the occurrence as “a despicable terrorist
act” to which “many indications point to Hamas…that Hamas is a terrorist
organization known for its attacks on innocent Civilians and which has used
kidnapping in the past.”32 Prime Minister David Cameron in his press statement
following the November Paris Attack, referred to terrorists who are “threatening the
lives of innocent civilians.”33 Most compelling is President Francois Hollande
statement calling the Paris Attacks “an act of absolute barbarity…[where]…the
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families are suffering grief and distress, and the country is suffering.”34 The
statements themselves, discussing the psychological effects such as grief and
distress after killing innocent civilians, is a propaganda tool to gain support for their
governments’ counterterrorism measures.
Emmanuel Todd has captured the essence of profiling Muslims as terrorists
within French society by analyzing the reaction after the Charlie Hebdo attack in
January of 2015. He discusses the French reaction from an internal French societal
level that captures a divisive, self-preservation of French society. He cites “profound
differentialism” as an internal social division of the immigrant population in which
“the dominant party on the French left does not view itself responsible for the wellbeing and the future of this part of the population.”35 While he admits that
“stick[ing] the label ‘Muslim’ onto this human diversity is…a racist act” (ibid., 153)
he identifies the French prison system and the jailing of people with a “recent
immigration origin” who endure “overpopulation…add[ing] to the harmful
atmosphere of the prison environment,” ibid., 171. France has systematically
succeeded in indirectly creating a segregated society rooted in its fundamentally
Catholic experience. Islamophobia and the profiling of Muslims as terrorists is the
result of internal racism and class inequality in order to maintain the French status
quo. In the end this example of profiling is inherently a fear mongering technique
that is common with any society who wants to maintain the status quo.
Hollande, Francois (November 14, 2015) Attacks in Paris–Statement by M.
Francois Hollande, President of the Republic, following the defence council meeting,
http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Paris-attacks-Official-statements#s-Attacks-inParis-Statement-by-M-Francois-Hollande-President-of-the-nbsp.
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While governments typically frame someone as a terrorist as a means to
defeat the enemy, the news media also contributes toward building the irrational
claim. When discussing how the news media supports this irrational claim, it is first
relevant to understand how terrorism is framed within their stories. First “the
nature of terrorism stories themselves…contain universal concerns like drama,
tragedy, fear, heroism, and survival36 [where] terrorism news leads to…the inherent
and universal shock, horror, sympathy, and unity such attacks bring,” ibid., 110.
Second, “framing occurs when media make[s] some aspects of a particular issue
more salient in order to promote “a certain problem definition, causal
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation,” ibid., 114.
Furthermore, an essential part of the coverage of the news media is to
understand that a large part of their sources come from the governments and Heads
of State from which the damage is being done. As Traugott and Brader suggest,
“coverage tends to focus on events and details, often from the perspective of the
government under attack,” ibid., 184. This means that, often times, the descriptions,
the information, and the sources of quotes come directly from the government
actors. As such “studies of how perpetrators are labeled (e.g., as “guerillas,”
“terrorists,” or “insurgents”) suggest the selective use of these terms by journalists
in ways that correspond to the interests of the government,” ibid. More often than
not, the perpetrators are labeled with such descriptions that suggest irrationality.
However, it is a means to securitize terrorism, making it an important international
Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion R. Just. Framing Terrorism: The News
Media, the Government, and the Public. (London: Taylor and Francis Book, 2003):
104.
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issue that makes it more convenient to generate support that a government needs in
order to maintain its power and control.
This rhetorical use of terrorism used by governments when classifying
certain groups as terrorist is a labeling mechanism that serves their political agenda
as oppose to aiding the understanding of terrorism. With terrorist acts a constant
threat creating an unstable international environment; understandably a
government’s response becomes the means by which a phenomenon like terrorism
is understood. The broader perspective is overlooked and tactics useful for
categorizing the perpetrators such as profiling becomes the normal defining tool.
However, it should be understood that this is reactionary and not an explanation of
the phenomenon.

Terrorism is Rational
On the surface, the appearance of blood-lust violence from an individual
seems irrational, but perhaps it is a means to an end or a means of individual
expression.37 If it is a means to an end, then the use of blood-lust violence can be
analyzed through the perspective of rationality. The rationalization of terrorism
dates back to the German radical theorist Karl Heinzen’s two-part Murder essay in
1849 where he provides “the first systematic justification for terrorism” or rather a
reason for killing in a moral context as “an act of legitimate self-defense when
directed against a murderous tyranny” ibid., 475. Though most of the rationalist
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thought refers to revolutionaries in Russia during the 19th Century, and an
“[attraction] to the developing doctrine of revolutionary socialism,” (ibid., 478) the
idea that violence used as an act of terror to obtain an end result is compelling
enough to say that those who kill in a blood-lust act of violence, must have a reason
for doing it.
There are two reasons for choosing to focus on rationalism. On the one hand,
groups that resort to terrorism are normally weaker than their enemies, and
therefore they might want to instigate a fear response from the audience as a means
to be taken seriously. Meaning that because these groups do not have a solid
military capacity or international recognition and support, their only tool to
generate change is through a response from the public and the adversary or target
government. Secondly, based on the logic suggested by scholars Neumann and
Smith who attempted to rationalize terrorism by associating it, in the context of
military strategies, with that of a campaign strategy. Neumann & Smith suggest,
”rationality on behalf of the terrorists [where]…terrorists will make an attempt to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets. Legitimate targets, which
typically include the institutions and the representatives of the state…can be
rationalized as agents of repression and, to that extent, attacks on them will
represent a discriminate targeting policy.”38
Neumann & Smith are quick to point out the challenge with the illegitimacy
or weakness argument, that “terrorists need to appeal to ‘hearts and minds’ and
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generate political strength in order to compensate for their military weakness
[thus]…prevent[ing] a full understanding of the military dynamics of terrorist
violence” ibid., 579. They clarify the “terrorist strategy” as “set[ting] the target a
series of (military) dilemmas and then challenge it to react” ibid., 579-580. An
important dimension of the terrorist strategy to consider within the military
dynamics of violence is the coercive nature of said violence as a threat. Here
Schelling’s diplomacy of violence is a good building block in which to elaborate on
Neumann & Smith’s concern of the understanding of the military dynamics of
terrorist violence. He says, “Military strategy…is now…the art of
coercion…intimidation [and it]…has become the diplomacy of violence.”39 Here the
diplomacy of violence can be discussed within the context of strategic terrorism and
psychological warfare.

Strategic Terrorism and Psychological Warfare
Strategic terrorism and psychological warfare are themes within the
literature on terrorism as rational actors that help explain a labeled terrorist
organization’s strategic advantages. The underlying motive within strategic
terrorism literature is that terrorists use the shock effect to provoke a response
from the enemy whose response will ultimately benefit the organization who
provokes by harboring support for the organization’s political agenda. Rapoport,
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refers to it as “politics of atrocity,”40 Nuemann and Smith refer to it as target
response,41 Kydd and Walter refer to it simply as provocation,42 and Freedman
refers to it as coercion.43 Even Nacos refers to Osama bin Laden having “considered
terrorism…as a vehicle to dispatch messages—“speeches” in his words
[and]…concluded that Americans…had heard and reacted to the indented
communications,” ibid., 3. “Bin Laden and his followers managed to set America’s
public agenda for many months, perhaps even years…” with the dramatic images
that were replicated on 9/11, ibid., 3.
To extend this idea, George McCormick utilizes game theory to discuss
terrorist strategic decision making in a rational way. In the study of terrorism a
“strategic frame has been…adapted [as]…an instrumental activity designed to
achieve or help achieve a specified set of long run and short run objectives [and]…is
forward-looking and “consequential,” in the sense that the decision to use terrorism
and the nature of the terrorism that is used are based on the anticipated
consequences of the current actions.”44 “What this implies…is that a terrorist
group’s decision to act (or not act)—a decision that includes its choice of targets,
tactics, and time—is influenced by the decisions of its opponents,” ibid., 482.
Gordon H. McCormick, “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political
Science 6 (2003): 484.
41 Peter R. Neumann ad M.L.R Smith, “Strategic Terrorism: The Framework and Its
Fallacies,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28, no. 4 (2005): 579-582.
42 Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism,”
International Security 3 no. 1 (2006): 51.
43 Lawrence Freedman, “Terrorism as a Strategy,” Government and Opposition 42, no.
3 (2007): 319.
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What George McCormick offers that sets his analysis of strategic terrorism
apart from the others is his connection to the Department of Defense that offers by
simple association, subjectivity toward concepts related to traditional warfare. The
choice of establishing targets, tactics and time is a forward-looking process that is
influenced by the decisions of its opponents. This is a logic that appears to resemble
military strategy, but at the same time is a useful means to explain terrorism tactics.
He therefore provides a strategic framework based on decisions where the terrorist
group relies on the choices of those countering its terror tactics, which means that
terrorism coexists with counterterrorism to be mutual reinforcing by their influence
toward one another.
Another theme present within the strategic terrorism literature concerns its
persuasive elements. While coercion and provocation both work on the level of
persuasion, it is the analysis of Neumann & Smith that deserves a well-rounded
explanation for its military and campaign strategic association. They start the
evaluation by identifying “a campaign of ‘strategic terrorism’…one…based on
achieving political effects primarily through terrorist violence.”45 In establishing
that “…the aim of a strategy of terrorism…[is]…to break the spirit and create a
sensation of fear within a target group…” three stages of strategic terrorism 1)
Disorientation, 2) Target Response, and 3) Gaining Legitimacy are identified as a
means to define Strategic Terrorism. The first attempts to break the perceived
psychological bond between the population and government (ibid., 577) “…by
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escalating the violence to a level where it appears that the authorities are unable to
prevent the spread of chaos…[thereby isolating] the individual from the regime and
environment [in hopes]…that he will become susceptible to the alternative political
program offered by the terrorists,” ibid. The second “is to set the target a series of
(military) dilemmas and then challenge it to react,” (ibid., 579-580) and the third
involves “[holding] out an attractive vision of a ‘new’ legitimacy,” ibid., 582. “The
eventual purpose…is to erode the target’s legitimacy and replace it with that of the
insurgents,” ibid., 585. This is done by “[exploiting] the emotional impact of the
violence [inserting] and alternative political message and [seeking] to broaden
support, often through the media” ibid., 590.
The basis of Neumann & Smith’s analysis lays in the campaign strategy of the
groups who commit terrorist acts and the effect of the campaign to disorient,
generate target response, and gain legitimacy. These goals are all contingent on the
art of persuasion, whether the recipient is the government or the mass population.
Neville Bolt also contributes to the debate on the role of persuasive elements
in strategic terrorism as a means to provoke the opponent into a response.
However, he offers a more symbolic analysis with regard to strategic terrorism. This
is to say that his analysis “draws on the symbiosis between Propaganda of the Deed
and global media, that near ubiquitous and instantaneous space where narratives
and myths have become the insurgent’s weapon of choice in a politico-military
strategy.”46 In that sense, he uses Propaganda of the Deed to draw on the
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psychological nature of terrorist acts where the propaganda of the Deed becomes a
psychological weapon that is driven by the constructed narratives and myths they
construct against the enemy.
He uses other defining concepts such as “political marketing” and “strategic
communication” to explain terrorism in today’s environment. By creating a
juxtaposition against 19th century use of POTD and late 20th Century POTD, he
identifies the failure in the 19th century being the inability “to convey a sustained
message and explain how using violence could deliver a better society,” (ibid., 50)
and says that new digital media… “allowed insurgents to use violent political acts
not just as kinetic or symbolic deeds but as systematic triggers for memory of
political-economic grievance and stories that tapped deep into communities’
spiritual lives,” ibid.
Bolt’s analysis is of particular importance because it emphasizes strategies
for marketing and propaganda that terrorists can utilize for the message. This is
portrayed within the concept of POTD, Political Marketing and Strategic
Communication. The former, having delved into marketing strategies, make up the 4
P’s. The 4 P’s associated with a “product-centric definition demanded four
prerequisites: ‘the right product backed by the right promotion and put in the right
place at the right price,” ibid., 37. As Bolt goes further into discussing political
marketing, he asks an important question with regard to insurgents, that is, ‘does
using violence disqualify insurgents from being political marketers?’ From this
question, he identifies al Qaeda’s ideologue, Ayman al-Zawahiri as having an
“attentiveness to the information marketplace, intuitively recognizing three of the
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marketing 4 P’s: namely, a willingness to adapt the product with the right
promotion in the right place,” ibid., 40.
Another important contribution from Bolt is the concept of ”Opportunity
Space”. He explains that speed is an asset of POTD to which “governments, media
and insurgents compete to control the opportunity space,” ibid., 111. Additionally,
most important to control this reaction aka “…POTD’s opportunity space, insurgents
command their own communications timeline—self-initiated and self-propelled”
ibid., 112. By competing for the Opportunity Space, “states must react to visual acts
of violence broadcast indiscriminately with instant global diffusion. This is
exacerbated where governments hesitate to intervene in ‘opportunity spaces’” ibid.,
193. Similarly to the previous scholars mentioned, he associates this method to
“disorientate an anxious public [where]…those spaces become the crisis arena for
political exploitation when images create an emotional impact,” ibid.
What is strategic about terrorism is the psychological effect it attempts to
exploit. It is here where Bolt’s symbolic approach to Propaganda of the Deed
contributes to the connection between strategic terrorism and psychological
warfare because he creates an operational means for understanding how terrorists
are able to persuade the masses on a psychological level with the use of narrative,
memory and myths. At an operational level, it becomes understandable why the
media is of high importance to the strategy of a labeled terrorist organization
because as Bolt says there is a symbiotic relationship between the media and
Propaganda of the Deed.
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Other scholars also associate terrorism with the media as a strategy. Nacos
highlights that “when one says “terrorism” in a democratic society, one also says
“media.” For terrorism by its very nature is a psychological weapon which depends
upon communicating a threat to a wider society…publicity via the mass media is not
an end in itself; it is a means to more important ends, namely the realization of
short- and medium-term or long term political objectives.”47
Furthermore, Siboni also discusses this psychological effect to which he
refers to as “the savage terrorist theater used by ISIS.”48 He discusses the
psychological effects from savagery as “[creating] an atmosphere of prolonged
international interest and awareness,” that is “[shaping] its cruel image” that in turn
“[creates] the impression of being more powerful than it actually is,” ibid. The
effects are very important to the terrorist strategy within the framework of
psychological warfare when considering that terrorists are operating within a scope
of weakness to the opposition. The effects seem to illustrate a need for power that is
obtained when the media discusses the spectacular and the savage cruelty, thus
creating a sense of legitimacy.

Irrationality is Rational
To be irrational is hence the strategy to which a labeled terrorist
organization wants within their strategy. That is, they want to provoke the
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emotional response that the media inevitably creates within the methods of how
they frame terrorists. The traditional hero/villain storyline is one that promotes
irrationality for the villain organization. For instance, “the events of 9/11 had a
powerful psychological impact for many Americans [where] health researchers
found elevated levels of depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress syndrome
among American adults and children after the attacks.”49 This means that “to induce
fear and anxiety” within a group of people is “one of terrorism’s central goals” that
focuses on “acts of brutality and violence that gain broad publicity,” ibid.
A scholar of terrorism, David Long supports the psychological claim50 by
arguing that “the immediate objective of the terrorist group is to create terror—not
destruction—and then to use the unreasonable fear and the resulting political
disaffection it has generated among the public to intimidate governments into
making political concessions in line with its political goals,” ibid., 6. Indeed, he claims
that terrorism is essentially a “psychological tactic, with fear and publicity two of its
most important elements,” ibid.
Through his analysis of American tourists who stayed away from Europe
between 1985 and 1986 he identifies “the transformation of reasonable fear into a
kind of irrational hysteria as a terrorist tactic,” (ibid) and continues to say that “in
order for terrorists to instill fear, they must publicize their activities
[and]…maximum public exposure after the fact is still more crucial…[in
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which]…victims, location, and timing of terrorist acts are all chosen with public
exposure in mind,” ibid.
With fear and publicity being important elements for strategic terrorism,
acting as communication outcomes for the acts committed by terrorists, then
communication becomes the key mechanism of control. Following the logic of Kydd
and Walter, who say that “the literature on uncertainty, conflict, and costly
signaling” are a helpful “starting point for a theory of terrorist strategies,” they
purport that “if uncertainty about power, resolve, and trustworthiness can lead to
violence, then communication on these topics is the key to preventing (or
instigating) conflict.”51 Hence, “because talk is cheap, states and terrorists who wish
to influence the behavior of an adversary must resort to costly signals” ibid., 58.
Costly signals defined as “actions so costly that bluffers and liars are
unwilling to take them,” (ibid) can explain the psychological effects and strategic use
of visual violence because it is categorized as a form costly signaling. It is a
communication mechanism that enables the producer of the images to appear
irrational to those who might bluff or lie. Visual violence, as a communication
mechanism, is presented as a form of power that counteracts those who would bluff
or lie and, simultaneously, signals the importance of the threat or damage that an
image illustrates to the audience. Furthermore, the idea that communication on
power, resolve and trustworthiness is key to preventing or instigating conflicts,
(ibid., 57) is critical when understanding why irrationality is rational because it
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shows that if communicated in an extreme way, the emotional response of fear and
anxiety will instigate a wanted conflict.
In his description of James Foley’s beheading video, Friis confirms that, “the
actual beheading is not explicitly shown in the video,”52 which means that ISIS chose
a form of costly signaling that allows the audience to imagine what actually
happened. Therefore, when left to imagination, the worst outcomes typically are
understood to have happened even if they did not. What “the video does show [is]
the black-clad insurgent pressing a knife against Foley’s throat, followed by a shot
displaying a beheaded body in a prone position with a head placed on the back, thus
leaving little hope for Foley’s fate,” ibid. This scenario when the audience reflects on
what they see leaves them feeling outraged, scared and potentially weak, especially
considering the role that Foley played, a civilian journalist. The audience speculates
that this cannot only happen to them, but anyone they know. In the initial stages,
this video worked in order to expose ISIS as a threat to the world because ISIS was
perceived as irrational, and with irrationality comes uncertainty that is threatening
to the world.
The video supports Long’s idea of “the most important operational
characteristic of terrorism [which] is the premeditated use of threat of violence.”53
What he refers as premeditated violence is crucial in understanding the impact that
the James Foley beheading video had on the public because the threat of violence
echoed everywhere. The plan of violence that ISIS could propagate is the impact and
Simone Molin Friis, “‘Beyond anything we have ever seen’: Beheading videos and
the visibility of violence in the war against ISIS,” International Affairs 91, no. 4
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not the act itself. People were rightly afraid of the uncertainty that ISIS posed to the
world because they planned to use the threat of violence once the video was
publicized to the world.
This further shows that “the impact of terrorism on the general public is
more psychological than physical” through victimization as well as fear, ibid., 1. He
says that “thousands of travelers avoid certain carriers or airports for fear of
hijacking or sabotage; senior business and government officials regularly undergo
training in how to avoid becoming terrorist victims; and when there is a major
terrorist attack, the media bring it right into the living rooms of millions of families
around the world,” ibid. The fear of victimization that Long argues here aligns with
Friis’ discussion about “beheading videos as a strategic tool for terrorist
organizations [that] provide[s] valuable insights into the strategic goals motivating
the production and dissemination of beheading videos.”54
While Friis admits that “videos shared on the Internet are nearly impossible
to control, given contemporary modes of circulation and reproduction [and
that]…the videos’ political impact is not a direct effect of the original intentions of
their producers,” he adds that “after their dissemination, the videos may be
watched, interpreted and translated by a wider audience; they may be circulated
extensively, censored or ignored; they may be reproduced, appropriated and
discussed on various media platforms; and they may be picked up by political
leaders and mobilized in political discourse,” ibid. Essentially, the videos’
Simone Molin Friis, “‘Beyond anything we have ever seen’: Beheading videos and
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dissemination forebodes uncertainty and with uncertainty comes the wanted
‘irrational’ label that many associate with the organization who produced the
content, thus ensuring maximum exposure.
Schelling’s description of coercive diplomacy is relevant when discussing
Long’s ‘psychological impact’ argument and how it relates to the utilization of visual
violence. As Long has discussed the transformation of fear to irrationality as a terror
tactic,55 Schelling helps to clarify the transformation process in the context of war
when he says that, “…the hurting does no good directly; it can work only indirectly
[to which] coercion depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on
damage already done.”56 While the indirect coercion that Schelling describes
explains the reasons behind wanting to appear irrational to the audience, it does not
fully explain the logic for why visuals is a useful mechanism that enables the
perception of irrationally. To answer the question, two organizations that utilize
visuals in which they themselves produce will be compared. The underlying
argument being that they are perceived as irrational by the audience based on the
amount of violence that is represented through the visual component.
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Chapter 3—The Red Brigades and the Three Stages of Images

The Red Brigades, “created from a “real schism” within the Italian
Communist Party (PCI)—is the history of a political movement operating with the
typical words, thoughts, and dogmas of a religious sect.”57 Their existence from its
rise to its fall can likewise “be described as having “three generations.”58 Sociologist
Robin Wagner-Pacifica describes the second generation as being “responsible for
the kidnapping of Moro while the first generation would be the “group that would
be on trial in Torino in March of 1978” ibid., 52. The first generation is unique
because of the particular political atmosphere in the “northern Italian city of Trento”
that influenced their ideological perspectives. Trento “was the home of both the
most progressive wing of the DC and the first accredited, university department of
sociology in Italy,” ibid. Such figures as the leading founder Renato Curcio were
influenced by such a “Trento Catholic/Sociologist matrix” in the late 1960s that
influenced their Marxist-Leninist leaning ideology as they progressed into the
radical and clandestine Red Brigades well-known in the 1970’s.
Additionally, Alison Jamieson divides the evolution of the Red Brigades into
three stages, the social from 1970 to 1974; the existential from 1975 to 1979 and
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the survivalist from 1980 onwards.59 The first stage was brought on my the “rapid
economic boom of the 1960s, the neglect of the problems caused by the mass
emigration from south to north and the inadequate social, housing, health,
educational and working conditions in…Turin, Milan and Genoa,” ibid., 511. The
Second stage is distinguished in a particular instance, “when the Red Brigades
murdered for the first time and lost a founding member in a gun battle with
police…[and subsequently became] fully equated with the acceptance of death given
and received,” ibid., 513. And “as the group members increasingly sought
clandestinity…their social analyses became more abstracted and removed from
practical reality,” ibid., 514. The third stage came immediately after the Moro killing
in which the group tried to maintain its clandestine activity while in prison.60
Those who belong to the first stage of the Red Brigades are known for “their
first major action [that] was carried out in 1972 when, on March 3,” [who was] “a
Sit-Siemens manager disliked by the workers for his dictatorial methods.”61 This
particular event produced a well-known photo.62 Those who belonged to the second
stage were responsible for the Moro killing and simultaneous murder, and those
who belonged to the third stage were responsible for the kidnapping and murder of
“the younger brother of ‘repentant’ terrorist Patrizio Peci…when Patrizio refused to
retract evidence against former companions; Roberto was shot 11 times on a stretch
Alison Jamieson, “Identity and morality in the Italian Red Brigades,” Terrorism and
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of waste land near Rome and a video film of the assassination [was] sent to the
authorities.”63 It is these three acts that produced three very different images that
range in degree of violence that this case study will be focused.
Based on these three events, and the way violence was utilized as visual
communication, the Red Brigades had varying degrees of impact toward their
audiences. In identifying the effects of violence and the psychological mechanism of
terrorism, David Moss postulates that “the total act of violence may have quite
distinct effects on various audiences reached by news of the act, and it might be that
none of the most consequential reactions among these audiences can be accurately
ascribed to “terror.”64 Hence, since fear is not the only reaction that would
potentially come out from the act of viewing an image, there is a more basic logic of
visual communication that the Red Brigades enforced within the three images.
Orsini outlines the timeline of the Red Brigades first kidnapping of 1972,
“that happened immediately after the start of the trial for the anarchist Pinelli’s
death. The victim, to be released after a “political process,” was Idalgo
Macchiarini…”65 When Orsini refers to release, what he describes about the actual
event is that the Red Brigades kidnapped Macchiarini, held a gun to his head for a
photo opportunity and let him go thereafter. The image itself shows a headshot of
Macchiarini with two guns pointing at both his left and right sides of his head,
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holding a sign that translates as “Hit and Run! Nothing will remain unpunished!.” His
expression, with no sign of pain or fear, shows a lack of interest as he gazes to the
left of the perpetrators who are not shown within the scene.
“The Red Brigades’ act of “armed propaganda” makes use of two
communicative channels, violence and texts,”66 and the Macchiarini image is a
perfect example of said armed propaganda. Their attempt at presenting the message
to the public, that those powers that Macchiarini represents will not go unpunished
as a gun is held to his head. This enables the imaginary violence to take place as
oppose to the reality of actually killing the victim. For the Red Brigades, at least in
the first stage, the use of visual communication is utilized for the political message.
The problem here is the expression on Macchiarini’s face. The message that is
presented unintentionally within the frame is somewhat comical. With
Macchiarini’s lack of concern and enthusiasm of the guns pointing at his head, the
image can be interpreted with a lack of seriousness to the kidnapping and potential
punishment itself. It is not until Moro that they finally learn that killing their victims
is a reality that must come to pass.
Before discussing the context of the Moro kidnapping, of the second stage of
the Red Brigades existence, a third more grotesque and overall inhumane video is
produced by the Red Brigades, only this time it is against Roberto Peci, an exbrigadist and younger brother of Patrizio Peci, a pentito, or informant to the Italian
government. Fellow brigadists kidnap him on June 10 1980 and on August 3…”the
David Moss, “Analysing Italian Political Violence as a Sequence of Communicative
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execution is filmed, with the notes of the “Internationale” in the background, so that
the Red Brigades can view the event.”67 This final image produced by the Red
Brigades is the most inhumane of all the images that were produced by the Red
Brigades.68 “Roberto is killed…in front of a ruined wall in the Rome suburbs,
surrounded by garbage. He is wearing the same clothes he had on fifty-four days
before. His body is riddled with eleven bullets. His face is unrecognizable. They
shoot him in the mouth, cheek, temple, and ear. His hands are tied with a chain. He
has gauze and sticking plaster over his eyes, mouth, and ears.”69
This final image, produced in the brigadist survivalist stage is most intriguing
in part because he was murdered, “when Patrizio refused to retract evidence against
former companions.”70 The resultant inhumane “video film of the assassination
[was] sent to the authorities ibid.” Based on this image, the brigadist show
themselves with an intentional irrationality based on the level of crude and
grotesque violence from Peci’s body within the frame. The message is clear: to leave
the Red Brigades a traitor is far worse than the opponent from which the Red
Brigades based their resistance. Moreover, because it is the brother of the informant
shows the level of punishment for condemning such an act. The family is not safe, so
those who belong to the Red Brigades should think several times before leaving.
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Though inhumane, this image should be further discussed within the context
of the survivalist stage in which most of the brigadists were leaving, many in prison
from the Moro kidnapping and murder, and internal bickering became the norm. As
Jamieson poignantly notes, “[The Red Brigades] began to kidnap and kill in
desperation and from rivalry” ibid. The Peci murder was an act of strategic
desperation and a last stich effort to survive that simultaneously presented the Red
Brigades with a high level of irrationality to those who would view the image and
video. In this case, the Red Brigades utilized inhumane images that presented
themselves as irrational as a desperate form of group survival. This is in contrast to
the scene of events that played out through the kidnapping and ultimate murder to
Aldo Moro who throughout the event held a dehumanized mind to kill.

The Red Brigades—A Mind to kill
While Orsini describes the Red Brigades as a political movement, he also
discusses the Red Brigades as a revolutionary sect which “is a sociopolitical
organization formed by separation from a historically consolidated political-cultural
tradition.”71 Within the same connotations of a revolutionary sect, he defines a
religious sect explaining that “every revolutionary sect is a “church
party”…[and]…to justify this separation, the sects typically accuse the “church” of
reaching a compromise with the powers of “this world” ibid., 6. To extend the
religious sect explanation he continues with descriptions coming from their own
documentation saying that “they are children of the light,” arriving in this world to
Alessandro Orsini, The Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-Set of
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punish and redeem, to destroy and purify. The Red Brigades want to wash away the
sins of capitalism with blood” ibid., 7. The way the Red Brigades justified their
actions through ideology (both revolutionary and religious in nature) is important
because they were able to follow through with the political agenda without remorse.
This connection between the religious and revolutionary sect to carry out a
political agenda is what is necessary for murder to take place without remorse. As
Orsini describes of the importance of the revolutionary sect, “it is inside the
revolutionary sect that the pedagogy of intolerance carries out its “dehumanization
of the enemy” procedure…it is in the revolutionary sect that a person becomes a
killer” ibid., 85. He further explains that sociopsychological conditions of “belonging
to an organized group” that “giving and receiving death becomes a “routine job” ibid.
Killing becomes nothing more than a small procedure within a larger picture of
purifying the world after the ideological justification has been adhered to by the
followers through a disassociation with the “human” they are set to murder.
The “educational pathway” needed to dehumanize the enemy is a process
that makes the enemy comparable to animals, as the Red Brigades spoke of their
enemies as “shit,” “filthy worms,” “swine,” “pigs,” “rabid dogs,” “servants,” “drudges,”
“wretches,” “filthy bastards,” delinquents,” and “neofascist bastards” ibid., 58-59.
Orsini explains, “When the enemy becomes a “monster,” a “State hangman,” a “filthy
mercenary,” a “State hack,” a “Zionist pig,” their lives become valueless” ibid., 59. As
brigadist Valerio Morucci says, “if you see him as a human being, you can no longer
kill him,” and Raffaele Fiore, noted as a “multiple murderer, who never repented nor
distanced himself from terrorism…degrade[d] the relationship between people to
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that between ‘animals’” as a means “to eliminate the enemy, adding: “We had no
type of direct relationship…with those we killed. Ours was a political bond. For us
they were symbols, political targets, and not people” ibid., 59-60.
Continuing to dissect the Red Brigades’ religious mind set, Orsini refers to
the words of ex brigadist Gianluca Codrini: “We’re profoundly marked by an
alienated social life…in which ‘separation’ seems to be the prevailing law: separation
between public and private, separation between being and awareness, separation
between your mind and your balls” ibid., 34. As they continue to delve deeper
within their own world, they continue to separate themselves from society, and as
Orsini says, “being “out of this world” is a key to understanding the mental process
leading to murder” ibid., 89. The Red Brigades essentially separated themselves
from society and the people who live within it to the point where they did not feel
any pain for their killings. While this mental process is essential to understand the
mind-set needed to kill without remorse, a mind-set some would label as irrational,
the main concept within this process is the inherent separation.
Jamieson highlights the social separation that took place upon entry in to the
Red Brigades. She says, “on the whole entry was refused on the basis of unsuitability
rather than attained by skills or merit” whereby leading “a ‘double life’ quickly
brought another test of commitment.”72 The environment was strict and to be
clandestine, isolation and separation became a necessity; from family, friends, and
other common daily human interactions and routines. For example “whenever
possible meals were to be consumed at home. Anything which could cause
Alison Jamieson, “Entry, discipline and exit in the Italian Red Brigades,” Terrorism
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disturbance to neighbors such as music or radio late at night were to be avoided
and…militants were to return home by midnight, ibid., 6. Furthermore, “the
spouse/partners, children and parents of anyone being sought by police would be
the first to be kept under surveillance…any contacts had to be strictly controlled and
limited, ibid., 6-7.
The initiation process to become a clandestine Brigadist took six months in
which “the first three months of clandestinity would be spent lying low, with few
social contacts and negligible political activity [and] after six months he/she would
be fully occupied with the political work of the organization, but would suffer
increasingly from the restricted social environment” seeing “at most two other
clandestine members in the course of any one day, ibid., 10. Separation was a key
component not only for the dehumanization effect that enabled murder without
remorse from the group members, but “the fact that the [Red Brigades] did have
such strict codes of conduct for every sphere of their activities was a major factor in
their survival” ibid., 7.
With that said, the concept of separation not only comes out of the societal
dimension, the “real schism” within the Italian Communist Party (PCI) that Orsini
notes,73 but it also comes out of the performance dimension (terrorism as a form of
a spectacle). Since the Red Brigades define themselves in opposition to the world
with reference to a revolutionary sect, their proceeding actions would be based on
their own reality; one that is expressed through a performance as a spectacle. Their
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attempt was the kidnapping of Aldo Moro and the resultant imitation mug shot
photo.74

Act One—The Kidnapping
Put in context, “the skill with which the Red Brigades brought off the Moro
kidnap and evaded the state authorities for 55 days while they continued to
circulate freely throughout the country, deliver 24 letters, nine communication and
attack people and property, made it the most successful terrorist attack ever seen in
Italy.”75 Wagner-Pacifici describes Aldo Moro as “a man of rigorous habit [who]
departed from his home in the Monte Mario section of Rome every morning at nine
o’clock.”76 Following this routine, “Moro was escorted each day by five men, all from
the south, all from poor backgrounds” who were always divided into two cars, “two
men with Moro, three in the other car,” in which “neither car was bullet proof,” ibid.
On this day, March 16, 1978, Moro was abducted on Via Fani by
“approximately ten people…some wore disguises designed to make them appear to
be Alitalia airline pilots waiting at the bus stop…others waited in parked cars,
another on a motorbike. One of their cars backed up from ahead, feigning a confused
driver unsure about the road, one approached from behind. They opened up
machine-gun fire, and in a minute it was over. All of the bodyguards were dead (four
killed immediately, one later at the hospital). Moro was pushed into one of the
See Appendix 1, Photo 2.
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commando cars, which sped off. He was then transferred to a waiting, ambulancestyled van which siren blaring, raced through the city to an unknown destination,”
ibid.
Wagner-Pacifici’s description of the kidnapping highlights some of the key
performance elements necessary for terrorism to work as a performance. For
instance, she notes the use of the machine gun, a fear-inducing weapon, the dead
bodyguards who were left behind in their visually grotesque and bloody forms, and
the “sirens blaring” that made for a dramatic Red Brigade exit. The kidnapping was
orchestrated by the Red Brigades as a performance. However, the leading
publications failed to comply with the Red Brigades in the manner they needed for
the performance to be fully framed. The Red Brigades attempt at using the
kidnapping as a performance is noted when immediately following the event itself
“at approximately 10:15 am, newsrooms in Rome, Milan, and Turin received phone
calls in which the Red Brigades claimed responsibility for the attack and the
kidnapping,” ibid., 62-63.
Overall, the event itself had all the makings of a dramatic performance, as
Wagner-Pacifici notes, “it was abrupt, unexpected, violent, and jarring…[taking]
place in the capital of Italy, the city of Parliament and political party headquarters,
the site of the Vatican and of the RAI headquarters…and it was…an unfinished
event” ibid., 68. However, the media responded in a manner that was unexpected:
instead of complying with the Red Brigades demands for the release of Moro, they
used Moro as a social drama in which “this event was presented to the protagonists
and audience alike as a series of competing interpretations…[whereby]…these
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interpretations were rhetorically structured in specific, namely narrative ways,”
ibid., 5. When looking at the media and paying particular attention to
interpretations, David Moss provides an explanation for this response that “by the
systemic use of violence…the Red Brigades establish a frame for communication
between themselves and the political defenders of that order, whose actions and
inactions cannot avoid interpretations as responses, direct or indirect to the…acts of
violence.”77 Meaning that by its very nature, interpretations of the acts of violence
are unavoidable, and in this case, the media was able to provide their own
interpretations through their own editorial process to the public. And as Moss
notes, “both parties [DC and PCI]…develop[ed] their own classificatory schemes to
identify and advertise the meaning of the Red Brigades’…actions…” ibid., 88.
Therefore, “political violence” as understood within the context of “legal
codes, political ideologies and mass beliefs…the Red Brigades wishing to use
violence as a mode of political communication must work in an already highly
interpreted context [in which case]…acts of violence…constitute resources to be
exploited in communicative acts as well as obstacles to intended uptake for the Red
Brigades and their opponents” ibid., 87. With violence being both a resource and an
obstacle for the Red Brigades, the interpretations of violence become a game
between their clandestine organization and the opposing political parties. Moreover,
because the political parties controlled the traditional modes of communication via
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newspapers, violence ultimately became an obstacle because the Red Brigades did
not have full control over their interpretations.

The Kidnapping—An Uncooperative Narration
Violence as a mode of communication tends to be uncooperative because of
the many interpretations that come from violence as a political message. As Moss
says, “violence…is a highly resistant medium…commonly subject to friction between
intended and actual results” ibid., 90. He further notes the communicative and
instrumental power that “legitimate authorities” maintain within their response
over such groups as the Red Brigades, whose capacity for such power is limited ibid.,
91. He then discusses the “many communicative shortcomings” with the use of
violence… [where]…the uncertain effects of violence are in part due to its inability to
transmit messages with any precision, ibid. This inability to transmit messages is
exemplified by the coverage from the Aldo Moro kidnapping and the proceeding
societal reactions to the event.
Wagner-Pacifici approaches the Moro case from an anthropological
framework with a focus on the rhetorical story telling and dramatization of events
both referencing the letters written by Moro during his 55 days in captivity and the
newspapers’ coverage. Though the “use of a dramatic paradigm for intercepting and
constructing the events”78 is her main analytical mechanism that places the Red
Brigades as a sideshow act, her explanations of Italy’s political history and the
juxtaposition between Aldo Moro’s political career against the background of the
Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici, The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986): 79.
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Red Brigades provides context in which to place the mug shot of Aldo Moro. In other
words, this context highlights how the actual events influenced the Italian
community based on how it was portrayed through the newspapers (Il Giornale
Nuovo, La Stampa, L’ Espresso, Il Messaggero, La Repubblica, Il Popolo, Corriere della
Sera and L’ Unità).
For example, “on the front page of the March 17 edition” of Il Popolo, an
“article about the flower vendor was titled “The Bothersome Character of the
Drama” ibid. Here, she intends to illustrate how “the party organ” acting as the
media, “was…constructing a dramatic plot out of the events,” ibid. Hence as the
article reads “The flower vendor, a minor character in this ferocious story,
unconsciously passed through the plot and remains, at least for now, the only one
who, if he had been interrogated, would have been able to give a very weak sign of
alarm,” (ibid.) she adds that Il Popolo was “designating major and minor parts, and
imagining roles for those who were present as well for those who were in fact, only
involved through their absence,” ibid.
In addition to the dramatization of the events, she also highlights moments in
which the newspapers performed the ‘othering’ technique. For instance, L’ Unità
referred to the Red Brigades as ‘beasts’ and Corriere della Sera referred to Aldo
Moro as a ‘baby’ within the course of the 55 days, ibid., 227. Though her analysis
spoke of the process of infantilization to explain this word choice instead of
explicitly referring to ‘othering’, she did mention their capacity for “inspiring horror
or pity,” ibid. The fact that these two publications portrayed the perpetrators as
‘beasts’ and the victim as ‘baby’ illustrates another level of complexity of the social
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reaction to the kidnapping of Aldo Moro, namely that the Red Brigades were in some
context considered ‘irrational’ from public perception.
The 55 day time period, as Wagner-Pacifici argues was a “drama” between
the Moro of the letters and the state-supporting protagonists” or those belonging to
party affiliates, ibid., 231. She cites Il Popolo’s March 31 article in which “Moro’s
own party published an article,” stating “that it is not possible to accept the
blackmail of the Red Brigades…this letter [of Moro’s], even though it is signed, has
little of the usual modes of expression of the man,” ibid., 229. This whole scenario,
how the party itself reacted to the Moro letters with doubts, describes how these
‘protagonists’ within the Moro social drama would not politically accept the Red
Brigades as a legitimate negotiating entity. While the letters themselves were used
by the Red Brigades as a negotiating tool for the release of Aldo Moro, they soon
discovered the lack of cooperation those they were in opposition to had in granting
their wishes.
Since the party had control of the media, they acted out the sequence of
events placing themselves in the role of a protagonist within their own self-created
social drama, and since they “are almost constantly surrounded by cameras and
tape recorder, journalists and microphones, crowds and institutional settings,”
(ibid., 231) the task of narrating themselves against Moro as oppose to granting the
Red Brigades wishes, became a natural progression. In this case, the public went
along with the “serial narrative mode” in which the society is “constantly being
provided with acted-out scenarios” ibid. Thus proving incapable of instigating a
cleavage between the media and the political parties, they had to use other means to
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make themselves appear like a credible ‘state-like’ entity because using the media,
that was a proven party organ, was not working in their favor.
Despite this illustration of a self-induced social drama promoted by the
media and the party alike, Wagner-Pacifici adds a scenario of “nonoccurrence”
which would show a level of cooperation and the wanted effect from the Red
Brigades by the political organs as she says, “In the case of the Moro social drama,
the most obvious nonoccurrence was the locating and releasing of, or the
negotiating for and having released Aldo Moro. The social drama’s ending would
have been very different if either of these modes of redemption were employed.”
The “nonoccurrence” was undoubtedly what the Red Brigades wanted. They wanted
to negotiate for Moro’s release, and the society through the narration of the party
organ, was noncompliant.
The Italian media was acting as a party organ in 1978; meaning that parties
like the Christian Democrats and the Italian Communist Party used it as their own
form of communication. While Wagner-Pacifici discusses the fifty-five day captivity
of Aldo Moro as a social drama, her analysis shows how much control the political
parties held to the existing Italian media by developing a social drama that focused
on Aldo Moro, and not the Red Brigades. By identifying the spaces as, “newspaper
pages, television screens, radio amplifiers, courtrooms, piazzas, [and] walls,” she
explains that they “contained and encouraged competing interpretations and forms
of discourse,” ibid., 2. The fact that these spaces encouraged competing
interpretations means that they created their own narratives about a kidnapping
that suited their agenda where facts were not the objective but rather stories that
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interpreted the coming information as a drama. The fifty-five days were dramatized
and influenced by the political parties and the Red Brigades failed to permeate this
dramatization with their message. They inevitably resorted to using visual violence
as a form of a performance as a means to show their credibility as a “state” to the
unresponsive audience.
The failure of the Red Brigades stems from the complexity of violence as an
act of communication. For the Red Brigades, this means that they “must construct
paradigmatic contrasts and syntagmatic relations from among this narrow set of
discriminable elements [identity of the victim or target, the timing, location and
form of the act] exploiting or avoiding existing meanings attached to types of
violence and creating recognizable conventions to perform successful illocutionary
[or warning] acts,” ibid. Therefore, “for a clandestine group seeking recognition as a
strategic actor the indexical features in any act of violence are particularly crucial
since they convey to other actors information about the groups which is not
otherwise obtainable.”79 They are competing with two forms of linguistic units the
text and the image as they attempt to point the focus toward punishment. This
syntagmatic or the relationship between two or more linguistic elements (visual
violence and text) is most relevant to Macchiarini’s photo, whose linguistic units are
competing within the overall message within the frame.
As a clandestine group, the Red Brigades want to provide information as a
political message. In this capacity, they can try to appear irrational with the use of
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acts of violence. The hard part is the distribution of the images that display the acts
of violence. The act of violence itself is not enough to be perceived as irrational,
there also need to be a visual narration of the violence that can capture this
perception. Without it, and the capacity to distribute with the intended agenda,
there is no success. As Alison Jamieson refers that despite the “most successful
terrorist action ever seen in Italy…the decisive…rejection of violence by the mass of
the population and the disapproval of the Moro action…drove the [Red Brigades]
into extreme isolation.”

Act Two—The People’s Prison Trial and the Moro Mug Shot
Following along the lines of producing their own mug shot of Aldo Moro, was
one last attempt at swaying the media to report their acts. Since the Moro letters
“that were bound for public domain…for publication in the daily editions of the
Italian press,” (ibid., 250) were unsuccessful, a “People’s Prison Trial” that mimicked
a democratic trial, was chosen as a means to make themselves be perceived in a
state-like manner. However, like the kidnapping, the media worked against their
attempt again, by “immediately set[ting] about to discredit this trial [whereby] all
but two…Italian papers printed the word trial between parentheses every time they
were referring to the “People’s Prison” trial” ibid., 247. Essentially, the coverage of
the trial did not promote to the statist perception that the Red Brigades wanted to
portray. They unsuccessfully mimicked a “democratic trial” in the hopes that the
state or party affiliates would listen; instead they mocked it. This is the difference
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between the Torino Trial which was “legitimate” and the “People’s Prison” trial
which was not.
Therefore, the Red Brigades produced their very own mug shot of Aldo Moro
and on May 6, it was distributed. The ubiquitous black and white photo80,
reproduced widely across the Italian press at the time, shows a somewhat content
Aldo Moro, holding a sign with the Italian newspaper’s name ‘La Repubblica’ as he
sits with ‘Brigate Rosse’ and its star logo in the background. What is particularly
distinctive and relevant of this photo, not least that the Red Brigades produced it
themselves, is the fact that they strategically placed the newspaper “La Repubblica”
at the forefront, as if they themselves owned the publication or they simply wanted
to mock the publication in the same manner they were mocked. In any case, “La
Repubblica edition had the front-page headlines “Moro Has Been Killed,” [in which
the story went]…”Unfortunately—said an administrator—at this point we think that
all there is left to do is wait for the last tragic piece of news.”81

The Red Brigades’ “People’s Prison”
Leading up to the Aldo Moro’s Mug shot, the Italian press was playing the
part of a party organ. They were essentially working in favor of the Red Brigades’
opposition, and not reporting on such terrorist acts they needed to be publicized
such as the kidnapping act or narrating the Moro letters in favor of negotiations.
Therefore, through the production of the image itself, they attempted to make a
See Appendix 1: Photo 2.
Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici, The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986): 253.
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photo worthy of publication in the daily newspapers. If they posed as the press
themselves, perhaps they could persuade for negotiations. When this did not
happen, one of the Brigadists, Mario Moretti did the inevitable, and murdered Aldo
Moro, leaving his corpse in a red Renault 4 on Via Michelangelo Caetani. The fiftyfive days in which Moro was held in captivity had been a tug of war where the Red
Brigades demanded negotiations, the party affiliates refused to comply using their
party organ (the media) to narrate their own drama and where the surrounding
public followed along with the narrations. The Red Brigades were not taken
seriously, so they produced their own mug shot photograph of Aldo Moro whose
intention was meant to illustrate a perception of power.
A photograph always holds a pattern and a meaning within a human
experience, and visual anthropology in particular “assumes that photographs…of
human experience may be both creations and concrete reflection of what is visible
within the scope of the lens and frame.”82 Furthermore, “photographs…are,
ultimately, complex reflections of a relationship between maker and subject in
which both play roles in shaping their character and content” ibid. With regard to
the photograph in question, the maker (Red Brigades) and subject (Aldo Moro)
convey a power relationship in which the Red Brigades present their authoritative
power through its production and function as a mug shot and the diminished
appearance Aldo Moro presents within the frame. Compared to the dominant
“Brigate Rosse” and its star logo behind, he appears very small and insignificant.
This, in itself, conveys a sense of authority on the part of the maker (the Red
Theo Van Leeuwen and Carey Jewitt. Handbook of Visual Analysis. (California: Sage
Publishing, 2001): 35.
82
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Brigades, thus making them superior to the authoritative role that “Prime Minister
Aldo Moro” and his party constituency, the Christian Democracy hold within the
Italian society they oppose.
The authoritative nature that is presented within the frame is also
understood within the societal understanding of a mug shot. The nature of a mug
shot is to illustrate the prisoner in his most vulnerable state, which the Red Brigades
did by taking away his authoritative appearance, appearing in a white button down
shirt as oppose to a suit and tie. Though his face shows no sign of abuse, he looks
neither sad nor happy as he looks up directly at the camera; his posture connotes a
sense of embarrassment and fragility as his shoulders slouch. A sense of
vulnerability, embarrassment and humiliation are essential emotive elements that
can be conveyed within a mug shot photo, elements that the Red Brigades fulfilled
within the frame.
The mug shot served its purpose in so far as the Red Brigades intended to
produce an image similar to a mug shot image typically produced within the
judicially accepted prison system. It is a symbol of the prison system that pits the
authoritative power on the side of those deemed as ‘beasts’ or irrational to the
public. However, there is a difference of power between holding Moro in captivity
after the kidnapping and producing an image to be presented to the press. This
difference is control. The Red Brigades had no control not only on how the
kidnapping was covered and reported, nor the coverage of the days holding Moro in
the “People’s Prison.” They only had full control over the production of the image.
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Authority is the first step, Irrationality the second: The Red Brigades’ Failure
Part of the Red Brigades representation within the Moro mug shot is a
perception of authoritative power. However, they lack the perception of
irrationality provided by the audience because they do not display a high level of
violence through the visual component. They were unable to access the needed
hysteria that would come from a high level of violence. It is for this reason that La
Repubblica, the newspaper seen within the mug shot, responded in a manner that
was accepting of the inevitable death. They were already claiming “Moro Has Been
Killed” within the headline before the death had actually happened. Therefore, it
was not used to convey the perception that the Red Brigades were irrational, crazy
or mentally unstable that would induce a fear response from the media or audience.
While Moro’s death was tragic, it was not committed by actors that were necessarily
perceived as irrational, despite a few banal references within the press. The Red
Brigades did not exploit the violence within the photograph itself to be perceived as
irrational.
Rancière’s earlier description of the “autonomous thing” describes why this
photograph did not instigate a reputation for the Red Brigades irrationality. The Red
Brigades did not exploit the needed level of violence nor the separation needed
between the artist and spectator within the photo to make a spectacle that would
associate them to irrationality within the society. As mentioned in chapter 1, the
“autonomous thing” is the distance between the producer and the spectator and the
spectacle is the “[confusion] of the two different distances [such as]…the distance
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between artist and spectator…[that is]…”inherent in the performance itself.”83 On
the one hand, the subject, Aldo Moro, had no fearful facial emotions that would
portray a sense of fear to the press or public in which the makers could use to their
benefit causing a cycle of irrational hysteria on the side of the public. Secondly,
while the distance between the artist and the spectator did make for a spectacle, in
order for this spectacle to work in favor of the Red Brigades, there had to be more
violence within the photograph. It is not enough to be perceived as an authoritarian
power, the Red Brigades had to be perceived as an irrational authoritarian power
who had no limits to what their violent capabilities could conjure to have any
salience within the media.
While the Red Brigades were castigated as the enemy, the way the media
dealt with them as an organization diminished their ‘terrorist’ credibility to cause
fear from being irrational. Not only were they mocked as is seen from the media’s
reaction to the “People’ Prison” trial, but they were also ignored and Aldo Moro
himself became the narrative focus within the social drama constructed by the
Italian press.
Still a conundrum remains, if the Red Brigades are labeled as a terrorist
group by today’s standards, and they maintained a mind-set of routine killings, then
why was the mug shot rendered visible by the Red Brigades as oppose to the actual
killing of Aldo Moro which would have provided for a more gruesome and inhumane
visual impact? Based on what the mug shot represents, authoritative judicial power,
the Red Brigades did not necessarily want to be perceived as irrational more so than
83
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wanting to be taken seriously within the Italian political organs and other entities.
Their goal was to negotiate for Aldo Moro’s release, not to cause irrational hysteria
within the public. The Red Brigades played the visual component safe.
They did not decide to present their image with a high level of irrationality
until their collective group identity was threatened. Visual violence in its extreme
format through the presentation of inhumanity was not a strategic necessity for the
Red Brigades to get their message across to their opponents. More useful to their
political agenda was sending a message of power represented through two linguistic
units: violence and text that represented itself as an illocutionary act, one that sends
a distinct warning to the opposing party. That is the logic of visual communication
that is present within all three photos that the Red Brigades played apart in their
production. Hence, irrationality, through the use of inhumanity was used as a
desperate act of survival. They wanted to show the consequences of leaving the
collective brigadist identity while equally showing the wider audience the level of
crude brutality their group as a whole could ultimately inflict on a given human
being. It was an act that represented their failure and inability to ultimately gain the
authority they tried to bargain within the leading political parties that dominated
the Italian government.
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Chapter 4—The Case of ISIS

There is no question that within the Middle Eastern region, there is often
confusion about “the various sub-currents of Islamic ideology” which nowadays “a
process of ideological hybridization has occurred, [resulting in] enemy of
hierarchies of many jihadist groups…becoming more unclear or heterogeneous than
they used to be.”84 To answer this observation, terrorism scholar, Hegghammer
argues, “that this hybridization is a result of strain and a sign of weakness [where]
when enemy hierarchies become unclear, undefined, or heterogeneous, then this
is…a sign of increasing radicalization and political isolation [and] groups often adopt
ambiguous enemy hierarchies because they are experiencing recruitment
problems,” ibid., 2. Hegghammer specifies his use of “hybridization” as “the mixing
of ideal rationales for violence and the attendant blending of their associated enemy
hierarchies,” ibid., 9.
For the purposes of understanding the origins of ISIS that is believed to have
stemmed from al-Qaeda, it is more relevant to explain how rather than why. As
Hegghammer observes, “modern jihadist organizations have always been somewhat
ideologically hybridized” ibid. If assumed what is argued here, that hybridization is
a sign of weakness, then it can also be assumed that ISIS is a hybrid of al-Qaeda
whose potential aim was to radicalize more for the purposes of recruitment. Hence,
ISIS history, and how it relates to al-Qaeda is vital in order to explain the logic
behind non-state actors’ use such visual violence and the extreme manslaughter.
Thomas Hegghammer, “The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups,” Hudson
Institute (2009): 1.
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ISIS, Performance Violence and Visual Power
Some consider the founding of training camp in Afghanistan in 2000 by the
Jordanian Musab al Zarqawi, as a helpful starting point to describe the origins of
ISIS,85 while others refer to its origins “with the 2003 Iraq War.”86 However, the
exact point of reference is irrelevant because the individual who gave rise to ISIS’s
fanaticism and brutality was Zarqawi, and he was involved in both events. His
organization “began as a small terrorist group, using high-profile attacks against
Shiites and international targets to undermine the Iraqi government and make a
name for itself,” ibid., 146. Still, it was not until 2004 when he pledged his allegiance
to Osama bin Laden that he named his group al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), and it is he who
committed many beheadings and other types of manslaughter until his death in a US
airstrike on June 7, 2006. Because of this brutality he was known as “the sheikh of
the slaughterers” (ibid., 131) and his history in prison has become an important
time period in which “he forged a close connection to…a Salafi preacher [and]…one
of the most important jihadist thinkers of the current age,” ibid.
The life of Zarqawi and his actions as a radical Islamist, whose fame and
image is based on committing many inhumane executions is crucial. Following the
logic of Che Guevara’s focoist approach, “the foco [being]…the small guerrilla center
or base,” (ibid., 126) Zarqawi is a political vanguard. Zarqawi’s actions of brutality
illustrate a guerrilla-centered focoist strategy in which, “the guerillas themselves
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are…the political vanguard, the only interpreter and guide for the masses,” ibid.
From Al Qaeda in Iraq, he was able to demonstrate violence that would radicalize
the masses and inevitably facilitate “people’s revolutionary spirit” that comes from
war, ibid. He was one of “the hard-core, militant believers: the vanguard of the
people, who could radicalize the masses, ibid., 127.”
ISIS has grown out of the radicalization of the masses, whose predecessor, Al
Qaeda, was based from the assumption that violence radicalizes. This means that,
“violence is…a catalyst for the nascent revolution, sparking ideological fervor in
otherwise quiescent populations [in which] the strategic goal is to use violence to
advertise the cause and radicalize the masses” ibid,. 130. Furthermore, one of the
leading Islamic movement scholars, al-Suri describes that “foreign aggression…is
the most suitable cause in fostering a ‘revolutionary climate’ that might be sparked
by focoist violence” ibid., 133. He further says that “military activity and armed
revolutionary jihadi action are what will compel the enemy to retreat” ibid., 131. Put
into perspective, this means that inhumane violence that Zarqawi exemplified had
an exponential influence based on the focoist logic that violence radicalizes the
masses. The radicalization of the masses is one argument for why the strategies for
conducting inhumane executions were adopted by al-Qaeda in Iraq and why ISIS has
chosen to continue as part of its strategy.
Another argument, perhaps related with the argument that violence
radicalizes, is based on Zarqawi’s experience in prison; in which case, there is a
correlation between Zarqawi’s prison experience and the rise of his slaughter
mentality. Prisons, at their core, are reminiscent of the foco or base in which the
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radicalization process happens that produces the vanguards that will uphold the
political agenda. Hence, prisons have become a hot house for extremist ideologies.
Emmanuel Todd, a French sociologist says, “[p]rison radicalizes everything: petty
delinquents become hardened criminals, and ordinary Muslims with traditional
beliefs end up as terrorists.”87 To this end, he adds that an understanding about the
mechanisms that “turn a fantastical, deformed version of Islam” can be associated to
“whether or not they have spent time in jail;” noting alienation of young people as a
variable within the prison environment, ibid.
Zarqawi’s death in 2006 is a prominent point that marks the beginning of the
hybridization process. The transition from al-Qaeda in Iraq to present day ISIS is
based within this period where many so called “jihadist” were captured and put into
prisons including: Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and Camp Bucca being the most
popular. Between the years 2007 to 2013, these jailed jihadists were able to
radicalize within the prison environment that led to the conceptualization of ISIS by
more extreme individuals. It is within the prison that their ideology was formed and
by which many of their initial recruits were taken. For instance, the attack on Abu
Ghraib prison in July of 2013 marked a significant progression of ISIS because they
were able to release 500 prisoners, which were used to build their growing army.88
Therefore, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamo Bay and Camp Bucca are infamous for fostering
extremist ideologies that helped create the foundation of ISIS.
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After the release of these prisoners, ISIS was able to expand its campaign
with more recruits adhering to its ideology. And in 2014, ISIS started to expand by
taking land; first with Fallujah and Ramadi in January, and then Mosul, Tikrit and Tal
Afar in June. Their state-building strategy was successfully being employed as they
established their rule over conquered territory in Iraq and Syria.
Nevertheless, it was not until August 19, 2014 with the release of the
infamous video of James Foley, which signaled ‘A message to America,’ and later on
September 2, 2014, with the release of the video of Steven Sotloff, that ISIS was
recognized as a threat. The moment ISIS released the video of James Foley,
President “Obama labeled ISIS a ‘cancer’ with a ‘nihilistic ideology’ and ‘no place in
the 21 century’; and on 10 September he argued that ‘if left unchecked, these
terrorists could pose a growing threat beyond [the Middle East]—including to the
United States.’”89
The other major video was released February 8, 2015 of the Jordanian Moath
Al Kasasbeh being burned to death in a professionally constructed video. Though
many more videos of prisoners wearing orange jumpsuits were released, these are
the ones that not only shocked the world the most, but also established the visual
representation of ISIS.
What makes ISIS different in the way they utilize visual and performance
violence is because “the means of dissemination have been transformed,” ibid., 733.
Friis in his analysis of the visibility of the beheading videos discusses the rapidity to
Simone Molin Friis, “‘Beyond anything we have ever seen’: Beheading videos and
the visibility of violence in the war against ISIS,” International Affairs 91, no. 4
(2015): 734.
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which these filmed beheadings can spread world wide with the use of savvy
technologies, ibid. He describes that, “within minutes of their initial dissemination,
journalists, monitoring companies, and social media users were noting the videos’
existence,” ibid. Although the “original videos” disappeared “relatively quickly from
the “mainstream social media platforms, images, frame-grabbed from videos” were
circulated that were eventually seen in the traditional televised media,” ibid. The
idea that a ‘screen grab’ cannot be erased whose image was “eventually established
as a recurrent visual representation of ISIS,” places the performance into the
category of visual power.
Moreover, these videos did “not [show] the actual act of killing, the screengrabs remained incomplete and suggestive shots of implications, but nonetheless
imbued with all the right cues for the viewer to imagine the end,” ibid., 733-734. In
effect, it is a “[constant reminder to] their viewers of the horrific actions perpetrated
by the ‘other side’” ibid., 734. In the case of James Foley, his image became “instant
icons,” (ibid., 733) where the rest of the world could remember the ‘look’ of ISIS. As
such, because an image can make someone an instant celebrity within popular
culture, there is a need for further research on visual power within the field of IR;
especially in relation to the new digital technologies and the sophistication of their
use. Particularly when dealing with labeled terrorist groups whose iconic images
present violence and inhumane methods of killings its prisoners (left to the
imagination of the viewer in the case of James Foley and Steven Sotloff) it is
important to understand the power an image can hold which has been translated
into a valuable weapon for those who use it.
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The subjects ISIS has chosen to target to publicize their inhumane killing
methods, most notably James Foley among others, have been journalists. It is a point
journalist Benjamin Hall makes clear as he chronicles the kidnapping of both James
Foley and his colleague John Cantlie’s starting November 22, 2012 in Idlib. He says,
“at the time ISIS, didn’t yet exist as an entity, and they had been captured instead by
Jabhat al-Nusra…when ISIS emerged, they must have been handed or sold on—ISIS
had been amassing Western journalists paying large money for them—knowing
their real worth.”90 The worth was within the visual violence that would be enacted.
There is a distinct power with the executions of the journalists in the way they are
visually constructed, performed and communicated as a weapon.
The term “Inhumane,” defined in chapter 1 as “acts of deliberately
exaggerated violence” whose “gruesome sight” is ”vivid and horrifying” that ”by
their demonstrative nature…elicit feelings of revulsion and anger in those who
witness them,” (Juergensmeyer) is a key concept in which this analysis is based in
order to deconstruct the effect that performance violence plays as a method within
warfare.

Fact or Fiction in performance violence—Jordanian Pilot Video Analysis
With the spectacle and theatre defined by Rancière and Debord91, the editing
i.e. narrative structure, and camera angles can be attributed to what Debord terms
‘separated powers’ within the Jordanian pilot video. ISIS has used its editing power,
Benjamin Hall, Inside ISIS: The Brutal Rise of a Terrorist Army (New York: Center
Street Hachette Book Group, 2015): 96-97.
91 See Chapter 1 “Performance Violence and the Spectacle.”
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or the power to produce what it wants the viewers to see and has made the
spectacle coincide with theatre, which is active participation. This is representative
of the selected images used to represent the video in question used to describe the
narrative structure.92
A man93 wearing an oversized orange T-shirt and trousers resembling those
of the detainees held in Guantanamo Bay and prisoners in the United States
approaches a line of soldiers in combative gear; combat boots and camouflage
uniform with a beige ski mask hiding their faces aligned with guns in hand. The
scene is staged for a dramatic effect. The hostage knows that what lays before him is
his death, looking into the eyes of combatants surrounding him high and low, he
looks into the eyes of the masked combative figures. Then the scene moves to him
standing in a cage drenched in gasoline and barred as if he is a tiger in a zoo. There
is a moment of anticipation as the audience looks at the expression of the man about
to be burned alive. And as the moment of truth comes, as a combative figure lights
the train of fire in slow motion, a harmonic sound of Arabic rhythms comes into play
as we watch the man suffer in pain as the flames consume his entire body until all is
left is a black figure whose fingers are shown in the last scene after the gravel is
poured over the body.
This combination of the spectacle and theatre, or fake versus real, is what
makes the Jordanian pilot video both ‘separate power’ and ‘active participation’
See Appendix 1.
ISIS captured Moath Al Kasasbeh after his F-16 plane landed in Raqqa on 24
December 2014 with reports indicating from the side of ISIS that they were
responsible from their heat seeking missiles and others from mainstream news
organizations such as CNN describing it as a “mechanical failure.”
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because it is making a spectacle out of a real event. Here, the spectacle of the
performance persists because of the confusion of the distance between the artist
and spectator that plays to the confusion of fake versus real in its interaction with
the audience.
The video is a form of theatrics because it plays to the spectator’s active
participation. It utilizes a sense of symbolism of how the United States treats its
criminals in the judicial system. It is particularly symbolic of the treatment of those
detainees held in Guantanamo Bay during the peak years of interrogations that
bordered on illegal torture by United States’ definition. As Fletcher and Stover
reference, “abuse does not rise to the level of torture under U.S. law unless such
abuse inflicts pain “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious
physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death…to qualify as torture, the infliction of pain had to be the “precise objective” of
the abuse rather than a by-product. An interrogator could know that his actions
could cause pain, but “if causing such harm is not the objective, he lacks the
requisite specific intent” to be found guilty of torture.”94
Furthermore, the environment in Guantanamo Bay was one described as
comparable to animals in a cage, particularly upon Camp X-Ray, opened for three
months in 2002. “The Camp consisted of 8’x 6’ wire-mesh cages connected by a
corrugated metal roof, while a row of wooden shacks served as interrogation rooms.
The open cages made them feel as if they were living outdoors, several former
Laurel E. Fletcher and Eric Stover, The Guantanamo Effect: Exposing the
Consequences of US Detention and Interrogation Practices. (University of California
Press, 2009): 9.
94
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detainees said,” ibid., 47. This said, the video’s theatrics are staged in such a way that
mimics the conditions in Guantanamo Bay where those members of ISIS are
portrayed as the “moral” figures punishing the detainee; only the precise objective is
death in this case.

To participate or not to participate, that is the question?
The act is real and staged and edited in such a dramatic way that leaves the
spectator wondering if it is a scene from a movie similar to Saving Private Ryan or an
actual event where we are witnessing first hand a man being burned alive. It being
the ladder, a sense of outrage from the audience seems to be the appropriate
response, which is just what happened from the Jordanians and those witnessing
the cinematography of ISIS. It leaves the audience wondering if the performance is
reflective of our society that prompts active participation or if it is a spectacle that
holds its own separate power and a pseudo reality to which no attention should be
brought. It confuses the audience, and particularly policy makers when trying to
determine if it is categorized as entertainment or something that decision makers
should react to in terms of their policies toward ISIS and its destruction.
Therefore, when trying to understand this particular video and its impact on
society, it is neither fake nor real and it is both a spectacle and staged theatrics, such
is performance violence. Performance violence is what happens when both the
spectacle and theatre, as defined by Debord and Rancière, are combined that creates
confusion for the audience on whether to act or not. It is therefore a psychological
weapon used to influence policy with the visual power the film insights with use of
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the inhumanity associated with the resultant death. Therefore, in reference to
Shakespeare, to participate or not to participate, that is the question? It is a pun that
leads to the question that maybe what Shakespeare said that “all the world’s a stage,
and all men and women merely players,” holds a sense of clarity particularly when
discussing the reality that the video supports from a theatre standpoint.

ISIS and the Fear Tactic
Zarqawi led the stage with a combined effort of theatre and spectacle. He
“understood the psychological warfare value of videos depicting ruthless, coldblooded murder.”95 In 2014, following in Zarqawi’s footsteps, ISIS led a series of
multiple beheadings and killings captured on video.
Suddenly, a stream of literature on ISIS began to trend in 2015 as journalists,
scholars and statesmen were determined to recount ISIS’ origin, explain who they
are as an organizational entity or offer any insight into how to combat the modern
day threat of ISIS who undoubtedly shocked the entire world with the use of their
perpetual videos displaying inhumanity. Sekulow, Weiss & Hassan, Stern & Berger,
Warrick, Stakelbeck, McCants, Hall, Cockburn and Gerges are among those who
published their experience and insight into ISIS, each offering their own
personalized interpretation into the infamous organization. However, it was Atwan
who offered the most comprehensive analysis and explanation of the technological
capabilities of modern times. He describes their “extreme violence” as “a deliberate
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strategy to instill fear in both its enemies and the people it seeks to subjugate,” and
is quick to fashion its historical precedent, ibid., 49.
Byman notes “the Islamic State is building its state methodically, developing
institutional structures, proselytizing, intimidating the population, and providing
minimal services as it conquers territory.”96 He references Charles Tilly’s famous
maxim about the nature of state building—“War made the state, and the state made
war”—adding that “terror and brutality serve state-building purposes” ibid., 140,
142. However, there is always a balancing act with the use of terror and brutality to
which “Zawahiri warned Zarqawi to avoid beheading and other measures that might
alienate the masses,” ibid., 143. In the case of ISIS’ actions, the use of fear and
violence to intimidate is coming at a cost: they are proving unable to legitimize
themselves as a sole power on an international scale.
While Zarqawi “stressed images of action and violence,” (ibid., 147)
understanding that “disseminating acts of spectacular violence is a way of fomenting
divisions, weakening the enemy, and recruiting,” (ibid., 148) these inhumane violent
images have functioned only to garner a high profile for the purposes of recruitment
and minimal action from the international community. These inhumane and
“graphic images of violence” have been useful to “dishearten [its] enemies, making
them more likely to flee,” ibid. This means that although ISIS has gotten the
attention of their adversary and induced a high level of fear, this fear tactic has not
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succeeded in coercing the United States to respond by sending in military troops to
combat ISIS.
The state-building tactic ISIS has chosen to use is a classical conquering
mechanism of war dating to the conquests of Alexander the Great’s, Persians, Greeks
and Romans, whose strategies of war were sound in the classical war framework of
Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” and the Prussian strategic theorist Carl Von Clausewitz
whose thoughts framed French Revolution tactics.
However, more fitting to ISIS strategic framework is the work of Schelling,
whose concept of diplomacy of violence, an indirect use of violence, helps to
understand how, strategically speaking, ISIS’ use of visual violence is having a
greater impact than brute force alone, (Schelling). Through his description of
diplomacy of violence, he argues that “the power to hurt is bargaining power” where
the “hurting…is measured in the suffering it can cause and the victims’ motivation to
avoid it [and]…suffering requires a victim that can feel pain or has something to
lose” (Schelling, 2). The concept of suffering is an integral part of the bargaining
power that Schelling discusses. Its basic premise can be used to explain ISIS’ use of
visual violence as he says “to inflict suffering gains nothing and saves nothing
directly; it can only make people behave to avoid it” ibid. Here, the power ISIS holds
is put forward as the amount of suffering that is created by the visual violence that is
distinguished with a high level of inhumanity. However, according to Schelling, the
effect of this suffering only goes so far as to make people behave to avoid it.
Therefore, though the medium of the Internet holds a sense of ubiquity through the
web sphere, the spectator has the means to avoid these images.
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In the case of ISIS, the effectiveness of “the coercive power to hurt” as a
concept, only goes so far as the “exploitation of enemy wants and fears,” (Schelling,
3). The visual violent aspect of what ISIS is putting forward for the audience is a
communication mechanism that is used to instill pain, hurt and fear. As Schelling
says, “…the power to hurt is often communicated by some performance of it
[and]…it is not the pain and damage itself but its influence on somebody’s behavior
that matters” ibid., 3. That said, the burning of the Jordanian pilot mimicking a movie
spectacle and theatre and the beheading videos of James Foley and Steven Sotloff
were only intended to influence the behavior or ISIS’ adversary, namely the United
States and European countries. ISIS wanted a response from these actors.
Though sometimes effective, the power to hurt is not always successful when
“it is the expectation of more violence that gets the wanted behavior[;]” (ibid.) a
sentiment that Schelling puts forward in this coercive diplomatic explanation of
violence. In the case of ISIS, it is not effective because they did not incite the wanted
response from the United States. The use of visual violence was an unsuccessful
experiment attempting to understand what its “adversary treasures and what scares
him” so as “to exploit a capacity for hurting and inflicting damage” ibid. However,
because the United States holds a lot of power and ISIS, realistically does not, on a
political, military, economic scale, ISIS tried to utilize the visual violence that would
suggest they have more power than in reality. The images show combative figures
with a high level of power compared to the victims. Furthermore, it was in their
benefit to be seen as barbaric, uncivilized, unpredictable and irrational because this
is where the power to hurt resides.
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ISIS—The Psychological Battlefield

The Diplomacy of Violence: The Bargaining Power of Hurt and The Tragedy of
Palmyra

Working within the construct of asymmetric warfare, there is interplay
between non-state actors and state actors that is coercive when communicating
with one another. Therefore, following Schelling’s diplomacy of violence “the usual
distinction between diplomacy and force is not merely in the instruments, words or
bullets, but in the relation between adversaries—in the interplay of motives and the
role of communication, understanding, compromise and restraint” ibid. Since ISIS
has an adversary who is considered to have the greatest military and economic
power of our time, the relations between the weak and strong (ISIS versus the
United States) has taken a more coercive diplomatic interplay, one which is more
psychological than physical. ISIS knows the strength of the United States, and they
developed a visual power whose impact within the perception. They are using their
own “bargaining” power that “can be polite or rude, entail threats as well as offers,
assume a status quo or ignore all rights and privileges, and assume mistrust rather
than trust” ibid. ISIS has been rude, threatened, ignored all rights and privileges,
been “aggressive...[and]…vicious” (ibid.) as they orchestrated their diplomacy of
violence.
Because ISIS’ power is maintained in its image whose impact is psychological
in nature, the best way to combat the United States and the rest of the international
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community is through continued psychological warfare, one in which their ideology
becomes their greatest asset. It becomes a battle of ideologies and not weapons. And
as Schelling associates the power to hurt as a form of bargaining power, with its
“sheer unacquisitive, unproductive power to destroy things that somebody
treasures, to inflict pain and grief,” (ibid.) ISIS is exploiting anything and everything
that could possibly hurt the international community on a psychological basis.
The destruction of Palmyra in Syria is just one of those instances where they
chose to use the power to hurt as their bargaining power. Culturally speaking,
witnessing the destruction of a history so valuable to our society, whose
preservation withstood thousands of years, and a great Empire, did hurt us all. We
witnessed with disillusionment and distain for the cultural insensitivity ISIS has
shown to a once pristine preserved sight as they publically demolished and sold
many of the significant artifacts into a black market.
The first ruin that ISIS chose to blatantly destroy was the Temple of Baal of
the Sun Temple, the second ruin was the monumental arch also known as the
victory arch, and the last was the Temple of Baalshamin. However, again, this
attempt to hurt has also been unsuccessful. When the Assad regime in Syria backed
by the Russian government recaptured Palmyra from ISIS control in March of 2016,
it was hailed by the Syrians and Russians as the “biggest ISIS defeat since 2014.”97
And in May of that year, Russian conductor, Valery Gergiev “performed a triumphal

Shaheen, Kareem. (May 27, 2016). ‘Assad Hails Syrian Regime’s Capture of
Palmyra from ISIS.’ The Guardian.
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concert in the theatre of Palmyra in Syria” with the title of the concert “With a
Prayer from Palmyra: Music Revives the Ancient Walls.”98 From a psychological
perspective, this momentous concert symbolized a combative move that the hurt
that ISIS attempted to instill on the public would not work because restoration could
be possible even after the damage was done. Palmyra could be preserved through
the books, and historical recollection of researchers and travelers from the 18th and
19th century.
This means that though Khaled Assad has tragically died under the
radicalism of the Islamic State, his work and preservation has not been lost even
with the destruction by ISIS on the main Temples. And with the Syrian army having
now reclaimed all of Palmyra, there is a universal concerted effort to restore the its
lost ruins. It is those scholars such as Jean-Baptiste Yon, a French researcher and
director for CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) and a collaborator
to which Khaled worked, who are combatting the damage done by ISIS.

Harding, Luke. (May 5, 2016). Palmyra Hosts Russian Concert after Recapture by
Syrian Forces. The Guardian.
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Chapter 5
Asymmetrical Warfare in context—Similarities and Differences between Red
Brigades and ISIS

The visual component interacts with the violent component when the
violence becomes a performance that is expressed as a spectacle. Here, there is a
separation between the active participant and the spectator in the act of viewing.
The spectacle then becomes a form of expression from a group, organization or
individual who are separated from themselves and the conjoining society or
environment they live. This has been explained within the context of the Red
Brigades and ISIS. From the visual analysis and comparison as non-state actors,
there are multiple similarities as well as differences that have come out of the
research.

Similarities—Red Brigades and ISIS
Dehumanization Process
The educational pathway, or what Orsini refers as the pedagogy of
intolerance is an important attribute within a killer’s mind-set, and it is a process
that both the Red Brigades and ISIS share. This pathway is a way to degrade the
relationship between people so as to kill without remorse. Once this emotional
separation between people occurs, killing becomes easy and blood becomes a
symbol. The logic behind visually showing blood is simple in its visual component; it
is a story. As Orsini says, “shedding blood is first of all a “story,” a way of reporting
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the “facts” common to all professional revolutionaries.”99 Once the dehumanization
occurs, blood can be used as a symbol of power. The Red Brigades and ISIS both
degraded their relationship between people to the point where they could murder
and use this murder as a symbol of their revolution.

Social Solidarity
Terrorist scholar Max Abrahms argues for the social benefits of using
terrorism, which is a similar attribute between the Red Brigades and ISIS. Abrahms’
main contention is that “terrorists…use terrorism primarily to develop strong
effective ties with fellow terrorists,”100 and though the Red Brigades and ISIS
rational behind using terrorism is not solely based on a communal solidarity, both
organizations share the benefits of social solidarity.
The founder of the Red Brigades, Renato Curcio, for instance, “embodies the
typical traits of the marginal and alienated individual who finds an answer to his
existential drama in revolutionary politics.”101 He had “tremendous psychological
difficulties adapting to Milan…to which he describes as a “foggy black nightmare”
from which he wants only to escape” ibid., 110. He eventually becomes a vagabond
and an alcoholic until he enters the Faculty of Sociology in Trento. When he formed
the Red Brigades with other alienated individuals, “they procured an incredible
satisfaction of a need they would never have been able to find in civil society,” ibid.,
Alessandro Orsini, The Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-Set of
Modern Terrorists, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009): 58.
100 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and
Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security 32 no. 4 (2008): 80.
101 Alessandro Orsini, The Anatomy of the Red Brigades: The Religious Mind-Set of
Modern Terrorists, (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009): 109.
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111. “Curcio removed himself from the world, in which he felt an outsider, to enter a
group with very close bonds of solidarity and in which everyone could have a
“heroic” function,” ibid. The Red Brigades was a brotherhood that filled the
emotional need to belong in a society that he felt cast him aside.
ISIS also functions with a sense of solidarity among likeminded individuals.
For ISIS, their social bonds were developed within the prisons in Iraq, such as Camp
Bucca and Abu Gharib. They were alienated until finding such radical thinkers as al
Baghdadi among other ‘focoist’ individuals. They eventually formed a bond with one
another based on similar alienated and marginalized experiences that enabled the
formation of a brotherhood that could not be matched. Their ideological bond can
not be broken. Abrahms again notes, at least in the case of al Qaeda among other
studied cases, the incentives for “joining the terrorist organization was having a
friend or relative in it…also consistent with a fascinating July 2007 study of
Guantanamo Bay detainees.”102 A “sample of 516 detainees that knowing an al-Qaida
member was a significantly better predictor than believing in the jihad for joining
terrorism, ibid. Based on what the Red Brigades and ISIS show, finding a common
bond acts as an incentive for joining the cuase. While not the sole rational for these
organizations to use terrorism, social solidarity is a strength they share.

The Prison Environment
The symbolism to the prison environment is a common reference that both
the Red Brigades and ISIS have utilized in some context within their various selfMax Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and
Counterterrorism Strategy,” International Security 32 no. 4 (2008): 98.
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produced visual frames and video. Both the mug shot showing the Prime Minister
Aldo Moro and the orange jump suit worn by Moath Al Kasasbeh contrasted with
the American military style attire worn by ISIS operatives were referenced as a
means to symbolize power over their perceived enemy. For the Red Brigades, the
enemy was the Italian government, for ISIS, it was the broader powers within the
international community, namely the United States.
Within asymmetrical warfare where the weaker power has a minimal
defensive capacity, this image perception can be very useful to raise the
authoritative power of the group. Since “…frames have an impact on our
perceptions of reality…and can influence…the ways citizens construe political
events,”103 the perceptions that are conveyed through image frame produced by the
Red Brigades and the video frame produced by ISIS have a large impact on how the
group is perceived by the spectator to hold a substantial amount of power. Hence,
the prison symbolism working within the frames also known as “organizing
principles that are socially shared and persistent over time…” have “meaningfully
structure[d] the social world[‘s],”104 perception of reality as it relates to the groups’
need to be perceived as powerful.

Mystery of Perpetrators in Image
Another similarity is the mystery of the perpetrators within the frames they
produce. The Brigades mug shot highlights the victim with no representation of a
Pokalova, E. (2010) Framing Separatism as Terrorism: Lessons from Kosovo.
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 33(5): 432.
104 Marco Pinfari, “Framing through Paradox: Egypt and the “Obama supports
Terrorism” Campaign,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40 no. 2 (2016): 3.
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brigadist. The only reference is their name and their logo. Likewise, while ISIS
operatives are seen in combative gear, their faces are masked. When a spectator to
the frames observes the mystery of the perpetrators while watching the victims
with such tangible clarity showing facial expressions, it dehumanizes these
perpetrators immediately. Through their mystery, they hold power.
This power is not arising from a societal dimension, but rather from the
performance itself. It is arising from the spectacle, that earlier was defined in terms
of specialization of power representing a hierarchical society and is “the existing
order’s uninterrupted discourse about itself…it is the self portrait of power in the
epoch of its totalitarian management of the existence…separation is the alpha and
the omega of the spectacle…the mythical order with which every power shrouds
itself from the beginning.”105
There is a lot to be said about the power that arises from the mystery of the
perpetrator within the words of Debord and his definition of the spectacle. The
spectacle being a self-portrait of power, is totalitarian in nature whose power
derives from separation. The separation is hence the mystery. They present
themselves in contrast to their victims who are not separated from reality. The Red
Brigades and ISIS have socially alienated themselves from reality that enables them
to use the power of mystery. They both hold a mythical order, which is to say that
they are representing a fictitious, imaginary and make-believe demeanor whose
power is derived from the performance itself.

105

Guy Debord, Society of the spectacle. (Detroit: Black & Red, 1983), 23-25.
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Elaborating further from Debord’s description of the spectacle, as a “separate
power developing in itself, in the growth of productivity by means of incessant
refinement of the division of labor,”(ibid., 25) this separate power perpetually grows
into reality. The mysterious nature of the perpetrators that is illustrated within the
frames produces a separate power that develops in itself until the world perceives it
as reality. Here, the power becomes psychological. Through the power of repetition,
the fictitious, imaginary and make-believe order becomes a reality. Mystery holds
power when it is conveyed through the performance of a spectacle.

Differences—Red Brigades and ISIS
Though the Red Brigades and ISIS share many common traits, there are two
distinct differences that separate their organizations. The first difference is the
targeted audience. The Red Brigades’ audience was domestic while ISIS’ audience
was primarily international. The audience of ISIS, while primarily international, is
also domestic, more so than al-Qaeda. The Jordanian pilot video itself is an example
of the type of domestic audience that ISIS focused its visual violence. For instance,
final credits of the video had a specific reference to Jordan by addressing Jordan’s
air force, which had a direct impact on Jordan.
Therefore, both the Red Brigades and ISIS have maintained a high level of
success relative to the outreach of their images within the context of their perceived
audience. Hence, when discussing the second difference below, it should be noted
that there is no difference in the medium used to convey their message, from the
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Polaroid to the Internet, both function successfully within the outreach of the
intended audience.
The second difference is the generational makeup of the revolutionaries who
make up the organizations. Simply put, the Red Brigades come from a different time
of technology than ISIS. The Red Brigades come from a generation where the
Polaroid camera was in fashion to capture an image. This means that in order to
reproduce an image multiple times required the media outlets’ cooperation who
would publish the image. The problem here is the dependence on the media outlets,
who in the case of the Red Brigades, proved to be uncooperative, as is exemplified
by the way L’ Unità decided to portray the Moro mug shot in its May 6 front page
layout. It “was dominated by two photographs of Moro, a “before”…full-faced, close
up shot, very clear and sharp…[and]…an “after” [which] is the Red Brigades on and
is reproduced in a very blurred manner…”106 The Red Brigades did not have control
of the medium, and for reproduction of their images, they had to rely on the
editorial boards of Italy’s news outlets that framed the photo in a manner that suited
their own agenda and not the Red Brigades’. The Red Brigades use of images,
illocutionary in nature, suited their personal agenda on a domestic level, but they
did not have complete control of the interpretations of their message. That is not to
say that they could have had any more success than they had by the utilization of the
Internet as a medium, but rather that visual narration requires complete control by
the party that is sending the message. The Internet is one such medium that is hard

Robin Erica Wagner-Pacifici, The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986): 253.
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to control whereby personal agendas can be told without editorial permission and
interpretations, it is up to the individual to decide the message.
ISIS has access to digitization that works well within the Internet to allow
their message to reach their intended international audience in a manner that suits
their personal agenda. Though not significant enough to make the effects of the
images themselves change the perception of the audience, the Internet as a medium
broadens the scope of viewership having an exponential emotional impact on the
audience. This means that the Internet enables more repetition that would allow the
reality that ISIS promotes to more easily become a reality to the spectators who
view their images. With more reproduction, their fictitious reality becomes real.

The Internet is the Message
“The medium is the message,” so says Marshall McLuhan, “because it is the
medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and
action.”107 This concept, having come into popularity in the 1960s was used to show
that the success of John F. Kennedy in the 1960 debates against Richard Nixon was
due to his appearance on television as oppose to the radio where Nixon proved to be
the dominant winner. If a candidate can win a debate based on his appearance, then
there is a certain level of power of visibility.
The importance of the “medium is the message” comes from the fact that it
explains a changing social phenomenon within the communications field; a natural

Marshall McLuhan, “Media is the Message,” in Understanding Media: The
Extensions of Man (New York: New American Library, 1964), 24.
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technological progression so to speak that, as time goes by, has greater ability to
impact its viewers and receivers of the message through the medium used.
It is therefore true that the Internet as a medium might prove to have a greater
impact on an audience for two reasons. First, because censorship is almost
impossible, and second, because in terms of the impact that spreading visual
components and producing meaning when “the scrap of an image…produce[s] a
new narrative” for the viewer, the emotional response is heightened with the
inhumanity associated with its high level of exposure. 108
Seeing that censorship is almost impossible when visual violence is
circulated through the Internet, the Internet is then more important compared to
others. ISIS chose to post their violent images and videos through specific Internet
platforms such as Twitter, YouTube and other social networking mediums because
they have the unrestrained ability to post exactly what they want with a higher level
of viewership that is harder to control; both in content and in accessibility.
One distinctive factor that separates the Internet from other mediums that
expose a group’s message and is circulated worldwide is the global use of social
networks and the modern day concepts of “trending” and “going viral” that help to
facilitate public discussion. Social media users simply need to open their Twitter,
Facebook or Instagram accounts and search within the popular hashtags of the day
to find what is trending or has gone viral, signifying what the world is discussing. In
2014, for instance, ISIS very strategically used “tweets sent from the accounts used
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by the propaganda operation” with the trending World Cup hashtags #Brazil2014,
#ENG, #France and #WC2014 as a means “to hijack the World Cup tournament to
spread their message.”109 This hijacking illustrates why a group like ISIS that is
considered “too weak to impose their will directly by force of arms”110 to use
Twitter’s hashtag mechanism as a medium of communicating their message that
would ensure their exposure in a transnational and global capacity.
Wordpress.com is another Internet medium that allows these images to
circulate across a wide audience. This medium, in particular, is a platform used by
many bloggers and aspiring journalists to which ISIS has used for its benefit.
Wordpress.com for instance was used by al Furqan Media Center when they posted
the image of a “carefully cropped screen-grabs111 showing the hostages, clad in
orange jumpsuits resembling the Guantanamo Bay detainee uniforms and kneeling
in the desert next to the black-clad ‘Jihadi John, were widely displayed across media
platforms,”112 Therefore, the fact that ISIS has access to circulate this image with a
what would seem to be journalist edge adds value to the visual power they have
access through with their images.
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Secondly, the visual component and the production of meaning construct an
emotional response from the audience toward the images themselves that are
published and circulated by ISIS through the Internet. This emotional response,
used as a psychological weapon with the effect it holds on the viewers, has changed
the nature of political communication. While the television and broadcast systems
have visual components that produce meaning, it is the Internet’s uncensored visual
content and global reach that distinguishes the medium. Hence Friis’ idea that, “in
the era of new media technologies and increased visual interconnectivity across
borders, the communication of the horrors of war through the visual imagery has
transformed and accelerated” (ibid., 728) has more value when understanding what
is referred to as transformation.
The transformation can be viewed within the social media platforms that
enable the global public to interact with the images by ‘sharing’, ‘retweeting’, and
‘liking’ the images and content that is posted. This means that the interaction from
these social media platforms facilitates a heightened emotional response because
the audience is not passive in their intake of the images. In this capacity, it becomes
difficult to distinguish what is a real life image versus a photo-shopped image.

The Internet is the Medium for The Digital Caliphate
It is the digital environment that gives ISIS its unique impact, and is the
inspiration for Atwan’s narration who says “without digital technology it is highly
unlikely that Islamic State would ever have come into existence, let alone been able

96
to survive and expand.”113 He gives preference to the digital explanation when he
shows the Islamic State commanders and recruits’ “tech-savvy” experience in which
he says “…coding (writing software programs, inputting information in html) is as
familiar to them as their mother tongue” and “most of the digital caliphate’s
business is conducted online,” ibid., 15. This tech-savvy expertise and spirit offers a
certain sense of credibility to the organization as it competes with its powerful
state-functioning adversaries. It is the reason for Moath Al Kasasbeh’s newsroom
inspired message before his inhumane death. He delivered it as if he were a
newscaster delivering the news to the audience.
The psychological effect that this delivers to the audience is the illusion of a great
power. Since, ISIS is reasonably not, compared to the United States, they are building
themselves up through the appearance of a state-like system. ISIS employs “professional
journalists, film-makers, photographers and editors…and has brought in cuttingedge technology and qualified operators…[that has resulted in] its film output
[having the] quality more usually associated with national broadcasters or even
Hollywood,” (ibid., 21) but on a larger strategic scale from which Neumann and
Smith hypothesize a strategic terrorism campaign, their efforts have only resulted in
a high profile exposure for the organization of ISIS.

113Abdel
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Visuals and Asymmetrical Warfare
With the visual acting as a power display, the violence reinforces the terror
component inherent in the terrorist attack. The relationship between the visual
component and the violent component that makes it useful as a terrorist tactic, as is
proven from the Red Brigades and ISIS comparison, is the level of inhumanity that is
presented through the narration itself. While the visual component might induce
power that the weak organization desires that the state or larger international
powers maintain, the perception of irrationality is what is needed from the visuals
in order to create the response from the target. The Red Brigades utilized this
inhumanity as a desperate act of survival and ISIS utilized it a method to appear
irrational to their opposing audience.

The Nature of Warfare and Coercive Diplomacy: Rethinking Rationality and
Irrationality in Warfare

Visual violence as a mechanism is one such example that illustrates this
change in the appearance of combat because it is strategically being used as a
weapon in warfare. Therefore, what the world is witnessing today where the
Internet is the medium that makes connectivity easier on a global scale is not a
change in the nature of warfare, but rather a change in the means by which the war
is fought. The players who fight in war still hold to the classical framework proposed
by Clausewitz in which he proposed the trinity of war strategy that is made up of the
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interplay between Politicians, People and Military, only now, the weapon and its
impact is based on a psychological effect and not one of brute force.
The way wars are fought today is through coercive diplomacy where threats
rather than force hold more power to make the adversary do what the opponent
wants. Therefore, though framed in a realism and nuclear deterrence logic,
Schelling’s description of coercive diplomacy is relevant when discussing the
psychological impact and utilization of visual violence in warfare. He says that “…the
hurting does no good directly; it can work only indirectly [to which] coercion
depends more on the threat of what is yet to come than on damage already done”
(Schelling, 172). The concept of coercion has a psychological impact that does not
require the status of a great power, but rather the illusion of a great power or lack
there of.
The results illustrate that in order for visual violence to be an effective tool in
coercive diplomacy, the responders must associate irrationality to the images
themselves. This can be done through fear or through labeling the enemy as
irrational. Without fear, inhumane visual violence holds no value in coercive
diplomacy, aka target response, because the psychological impact is most
pronounced when the adversary fears those who show inhumane visual violence in
a coercive manner.
However, inhumane visual violence might be successful in other persuasive
capacities such as a last act of group survival. In the case of the Red Brigades, they
killed Roberto Peci in desperation to maintain their group, and they used this
inhumanity to appear irrational to the audience.
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These two cases illustrate that the logic of coercive diplomacy needs to be
developed to include irrational behavior. While political and behavioral scientist
Alexander George criticizes the abstract theory of coercive diplomacy that “assumes
pure rationality on the part of the opponent—an ability to receive all relevant
information, evaluate it correctly, make proper judgments as to the credibility and
potency of the threat, and see that it is in his interest to accede to the demand made
on him,”114 by discussing the abstract theory of coercive diplomacy and its of
consideration for “…the possibility of misperception and miscalculation or that an
opponent’s “rationality” is affected by psychological variables and by values, culture,
and tradition that may differ from those of the coercive state ibid.”
Though oriented toward policy makers, the misperceptions and
miscalculations of the opponents “rationality” that is affected by psychological
variables are extremely important in the context of coercive diplomacy. It is based
on the traditional military strategic thinking of Sun Tzu who says know thy enemy.
Had the adversary of ISIS considered the psychological variables that contributed to
its rise, such as the prison and captivity mentality and the mistreatments and
torture methods that were endured, they would be better equipped to understand
that ISIS is indeed acting in a rational way when they are making themselves appear
to be irrational as they went about utilizing inhumane visual violent deaths.
Irrationality holds its explanatory power when discussing the current
international environment of terrorism. It is extremely valuable to terrorist

Alexander George, “Coercive Diplomacy,” in The Use of Force, ed. Robert Art and
Kenneth Waltz (Maryland: Rowan & Littlefield, 2009), 72.
114

100
organizations because it offers a sense of unpredictability and uncertainty to their
strategy as they follow through with their coercive diplomacy. As Schelling noted,
“…uncertainty exists. Not everybody is always in his right mind. Not all the frontiers
and thresholds are precisely defined, fully reliable, and known to be so beyond the
least temptation to test them out, to explore for loopholes, or to take a chance that
they may be disconnected this time,” (Schelling, 93). Irrationality is inherently
uncertain and in a strategic mindset, this uncertainty allows those who use it to
explore these loopholes in the system. Uncertainty enables the non-state actors to
test the thresholds of their adversaries in order to see how far they can go before
they can manipulate a response.
Schelling himself also questions rationality in conducting war. He says, “true,
there is a sense in which anything done coolly, deliberately, on schedule, by plan,
upon reflection, in accordance with rules and formulae, and pursuant to a calculus,
is “rational” but it is in a very limited sense” ibid., 183. He then says, “even if this
kind of warfare is irrational it could still enjoy the benefits of slowness, of
deliberateness, and self-control” ibid. Most poignant of his argument on rationality
is when he says, “nor is there any guarantee—or even a moderate presumption—
that the more rational of two adversaries will come off the better in this kind of
limited exchange. There is, in fact, likely to be great advantage in appearing to be on
the verge of total abandon. However rational the adversaries, they may compete to
appear the more irrational, impetuous, and stubborn” ibid. Though Schelling is
discussing rationality and irrationality in the context of nuclear deterrence in the
Cold War era, he points to something that should be taken into account when

101
developing the concept of coercive diplomacy, that rationality is not as simple in
warfare as previously believed.
In this day and age, with asymmetrical warfare at center stage as oppose to
conventional warfare, why and how a group, organization, state or enemy is
perceived as irrational would help explain actions, especially when one group is
weaker than the other. Visual violence is one such mechanism that enables the
perception of irrationality to be used within coercive diplomacy. Hence, the
concepts of irrationality and rationality should be developed within asymmetrical
warfare.

The Role of Visual Violence in Warfare and Insights for Further Research

Visual Violence as a concept, being distinguished from its visual component
and its violent component, does not have the desired impact unless the image
contains two features: the perception of irrationality and a high level of inhumanity.
Without these two features represented within the frame, the non-state actor is not
utilizing the extreme form of communication to its full capacity. This is because the
role of visual violence, as an extreme form of communication, is only effective when
it used to induce a high level of fear and publicity. Fear and publicity are the desired
ends within the means of visual violence.
This research has served to clarify the impact on the audience who views the
visual violence in relation to terrorist acts by analyzing two non-state actors. In its
broader framework based on Schelling’s diplomacy of violence elaborated as “the
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art of coercion” and “intimidation” where the “instruments of war are…punitive,“
visual violence serves as an instrument in warfare used with the intention to punish.
Visual violence is indirect coercion and the “hurting…is measured in the suffering it
can cause and the victims’ motivation to avoid it” ibid., 2. This analysis goes a step
further in identifying the concept of suffering and highlighting the inhumanity
within the visual component as a form of violence. Inhumanity is a useful measuring
tool within a visually violent image because it determines the level of fear that is
expected as the response from the audience.
Visual terror being defined by a high level of inhumanity represented within
the frame leads to further questions about who holds the power. For instance, is it
the audience, the producer or the interpreter of the image? While this comparative
and visual analysis would lead me to suggest the ladder, more research is necessary
to substantiate this finding in a more systematic and quantifiable manner, using
inhumanity as the leading concept within visual terror.
Another leading question is based on the irrational/rational dichotomy
within indirect coercion. If “coercion depends more on the threat of what is to come
than on the damage already done”(ibid., 172) as Schelling suggests, to what extent
can the perception of irrationality determine the threat of what is to come?
Specifically, is irrationality a determining factor in coercive behavior? What role
does it play in coercive diplomacy? As the leading assumption within this thesis, the
perception of irrationality as a rational behavior deserves further research within
the theoretical framework of coercive diplomacy within asymmetrical warfare.
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Finally, though this research does not focus on counterterrorism measures, it
does shed light on the role of the audience. The role of the audience is relevant in
the context of our own power as the viewer of the visual violence. Therefore, in
understanding this power that we have, there are certain policy implications that
can be applied to counterterrorism from understanding the role of the audience in
terms of the fear and publicity outcomes that result from visual violence. The
outcomes of fear and publicity deserve further research within the framework of
counterterrorism.
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Appendix 2—The Narrative Structure through Image: the Inhumane Death
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